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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine the preferences of clients of programs 
administered by selected federal agencies and the preferences of the federal managers who 
administer the programs in assessing performance measurement systems. Using the general 
progression of previous budgetary models used in the public sector, the researcher developed the 
Modified Balance Scorecard (MBSC), a performance measurement model designed specifically 
for use within the public sector.  
Surveys based on the MBSC were administered to public managers and to clients of those 
managers in order to determine their preferences. The results showed that managers preferred 
public good measures and clients preferred financial measures. Both groups’ second preferred 
index of measures was internal management process measures.  
This research is important in policy formulation and provides many implications 
regarding the effective presentation of policies. These results can be used to help craft policies 
for maximum effectiveness, based on the preferences of the respective groups.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the preferences of clients of programs 
administered by selected federal agencies and the preferences of the federal managers who 
administer the programs in assessing performance measurement systems. Using the general 
progression of previous budgetary models used in the public sector, the researcher developed the 
Modified Balance Scorecard (MBSC), a performance measurement model designed specifically 
for use within the public sector. The MBSC is a combination of elements of previous budgetary 
models that uses five various measurement perspectives to assess the overall performance of 
entire systems, whether individual programs or entire organizations. These perspectives include 
the financial perspective, the client perspective, the employee perspective, the internal 
management process perspective, and the public good perspective.  
In the present research, the preferences of the clients and the managers were measured 
using two separate survey instruments, one designed specifically for the assessment of the 
clients’ preferences and one designed for the assessment of the managers’ preferences. The 
results of this research are important in policy formulation and provide many implications 
regarding the effective presentation of policies. These results can be used to help effectively craft 
policies so that these policies can be presented to various groups, based on the preferences of the 
particular group to which the policy is being presented. 
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This dissertation sought to answer the following research questions: What measures 
should be included in the MBSC model? What are the stakeholders’ preferences for the 
measures? What determines the preferences for the measures? 
The research was conducted in two phases. In the first phase, existing literature was 
examined and synthesized to develop a comprehensive performance evaluation model. The 
Balanced Scorecard (BSC) model was used as the general framework for the development of this 
comprehensive model as it integrates both financial and non-financial measures. The resulting 
model reflects a comprehensive approach to assessing the effectiveness of programs 
administered by federal government agencies in an accurate and valid way. 
The preferences of federal managers and their clients were measured through two 
separate questionnaires. The first survey was administered to federal business clients as a 
convenience survey at the 15th Annual Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization 
(OSDBU) Procurement Conference, which was held on April 21, 2005, at The Show Place 
Arena in Upper Marlboro, MD. The second was administered by mail to managers from the 66 
federal agencies. Data generated from the results of the surveys were used to analyze the 
preferences of federal program managers and federally program clients.  
Prior to the development of the BSC, there were several competing major measurement 
models. These models are examined in the literature review. This dissertation proposed an 
additional, more developed, and further refined model that can be used for the effective 
assessment of programs administered by federal government agencies. However, the main 
purpose of this dissertation was to determine the preferences of federal managers and federal 
program clients in performance measurement systems. 
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This dissertation contributes to the existing body of knowledge in several ways. First, it 
adds to the literature by incorporating a major aspect of performance measurement within the 
federal arena that has not previously been formally used within any budgetary assessment 
model—the public good. The public good is what basically separates the modified balanced 
scorecard model apart from the BSC. Some previous budgetary models have typically focused on 
the evaluation of resources consumed for services or production, while others have addressed 
organizational outputs or outcomes. In this dissertation a comprehensive measurement model 
was developed to evaluate all major aspects of an organization’s operations—including both 
organizational outputs and organizational outcomes. The interrelationships among the different 
measures were examined and the model was used to quantify the preferences of the respondents. 
In commercial entities, performance measurement is clearly reflected by the entities’ 
profitability. However, it is much more difficult to measure performance when it falls under the 
general guise of public entities. This dissertation identifies an appropriate measurement system 
that captures the essence of the important measures in governmental and other non-profit entities.  
Second, this dissertation identifies the performance measurement preferences of both the 
clients of federal programs and the managers that administer these federal programs. 
Additionally, various possible determinants of those performance measurement preferences were 
examined. These results can then be used to analyze and present policies so as to reflect these 
stakeholder groups’ specific preferences for organizational performance. Though there are other 
groups found within the model (e.g., employees), only clients and managers were considered for 
this study. The results of this research should be useful in the area of policymaking and analysis, 
more specifically within the formulation and presentation of organizational performance 
assessment policies.  
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Third, this dissertation builds on a body of knowledge regarding the empirical evaluation 
of the performance measurement preferences of managers and clients. Additionally, bodies of 
knowledge can be initiated regarding the preferences of the other groups found within the 
MBSC. Through further evaluation and ancillary empirical research, the preferences of each of 
the various stakeholder groups can be empirically assessed so that policies can be crafted to best 
satisfy the preferences of each group as the policy is being presented to that specific groups. 
Accordingly, if the policy is presented to a group, based on the preferences of that group, then 
the likelihood of that group accepting the policy should increase.  
Throughout this dissertation, the OSDBU was used for illustrative purposes. The primary 
purpose of the OSDBU is to promote the utilization of small, disadvantaged, and women-owned 
businesses by federal governmental agencies. Though the utilization of small businesses is 
encouraged throughout all federal agencies, the OSDBU was established for the specific purpose 
of helping the federal government reach its small business goals. The OSDBU accomplishes this 
by using various programs designed to assist the small business owner in preparing to conduct 
business with the federal government via contracting. More specifically, this office assists these 
firms in obtaining contracts and subcontracts with agencies such as NASA and prime contractors 
that conduct business with these federal agencies by helping these entrepreneurs hone their skills 
and make themselves as marketable as possible to these federal agencies and their prime 
contractors. 
This dissertation consists of seven chapters. Chapter I introduced the basic research 
questions and the other underlying issues. Chapter II provides a review of the history and 
relevant literature regarding various models of measurement. Chapter III presents the Modified 
Balance Score Card model and elaborates on the significance of the contribution made by this 
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dissertation. Chapter IV outlines the methodology for conducting both phases of this research. 
Chapter V presents the results of the client survey. Chapter VI presents the findings of the 
manager survey. Chapter VII presents and discusses the findings and conclusions from both sets 
of participants. Additionally, the policy implications and recommendations of these findings are 
explored in Chapter VII.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the literature related to developing the 
measurement model used in this dissertation. In this chapter, the commonly used terminology 
regarding the measurement of performance within organizations is presented. The literature for 
previous measurement models is examined and reviewed. Finally, the literature is summarized, 
including an examination of the shortcomings of previous measurement models.  
Definitions of Measures 
Various measures have been used to assess operational efficiency and effectiveness. In a 
commonly-accepted typology derived from the open-system theory (Easton, 1979; Katz & Kahn, 
1966; Thompson, 1967), performance measures (PM) can be grouped into the three basic 
categories of input, output, and outcome measures (Greytak, Phares, & Morley, 1976). Input 
measures are used to assess the resources that governments consume in producing a service or 
(less often) a product. This is why inputs are considered to be the building blocks for efficiency 
measures. These measures are easy to define and often readily available (Tigue & Strachota, 
1994). On the other hand, inputs fail to indicate levels of services or achievement. This is why 
most studies of performance measures in local service delivery do not count inputs as 
performance measures. Examples of classification of inputs by purchase type include personnel, 
supplies, equipment, utilities, and contractual services.  
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Output is a measure of “the amount of a product produced, service rendered, or work 
done, without consideration as to the quality or desirability of what has been done” (Greytak et. 
al., 1976, p. 17). Outputs are sometimes referred to as “workload” measures (Ammons, 2002) 
and occasionally are used to measure productivity (Morley, 1986). Continuing to use the 
OSDBU for illustrative purposes, an example of an output would be the number of clients 
receiving agency services. Several studies connect output of a service with the cost incurred by 
the service to measure the efficiency of this service delivery (Greytak et. al., 1976; Hatry, 1979; 
Millar, Hatry, & Koss, 1977; Morley, Vinson, & Hatry, 2001; Rossi & Freeman, 1989; Wholey 
& Hatry, 1992, 2004).  
Outcome measures address the achievements or consequences of supplying public 
services to targeted recipients (Greytak et. al., 1976; Wholey, Hatry, Newcomer, & Manion, 
1997). Outcomes are sometimes referred to as “impact” in the literature of program evaluation 
(Rossi & Freeman, 1989). Some authors prefer to use “outcome” as the short-term result of a 
program and “impact” as the long-term result (Levy, Meltsner, & Wildavsky, 1974). Within the 
OSDBU, an outcome measure is the assessment of the quality of service supplied, while an 
output measure is the quantity of service supplied (Tigue & Strachota, 1994). Within the 
OSDBU, an example of an outcome would be the number of clients who, after attending their 
training program, successfully secured federal contracts or subcontracts. 
Use of Measures in the Public Sector: A Review of Budgeting Literature  
Performance measurement has been discussed in the context of the strategic planning 
process, the budgeting process, human resource management, and many other organizational 
processes. This study reviewed the literature of performance measurement examined in the 
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public budgetary process because performance measures have been widely used in the budgeting 
process within the public sector. Though a variety of measures have been developed and 
implemented to assist budgetary decision-making process, truly adequate systems remain 
evasive. This situation occurs largely because performance measurement systems are situational 
in nature, as opposed to being universal, and they are socially constructed, as opposed to being 
technically constructed (Johnston, 2005). In one case study, environmental factors related to 
demand was shown to be the strongest single determinant of performance (Fernandes, Mills & 
Fleury (2005). Nevertheless, the literature about the use of performance measurement in the 
public budgeting process is rich and growing, providing a solid theoretical foundation that is 
needed for the formulation of the Modified Balance Score Card (MBSC) model used in this 
study. Studies have been conducted to evaluate the budget cycles process (Bouckaert & Peters, 
2002; Broom, 1995; Joyce, 1993; Martin, 2000; Melkers & Willoughby, 2001; Mercer, 2002; 
Voytek, Lellock, & Schmit, 2004; Walker, 2002; Wang, 2000). This dissertation focuses on the 
measurement literature of six major budgeting models, with the MBSC model evolving through 
the integration of the existing literature. That is, the existing body of knowledge was examined 
and integrated, thereby resulting in the evolution of a new model which became the MBSC. 
Every budget system comprises the purposes and functions of planning, management, 
and control (Schick, 1994). Planning involves the determination of objectives, the evaluation of 
alternative courses of action, and the authorization of select programs. Planning is most closely 
linked to budget preparation. Management involves the programming of approved goals into 
specific projects and activities, the design of organizational units to carry out approved 
programs, and the staffing of these units and the procurement of necessary resources to 
operationalize the plans. The management process is spread over the entire budget cycle. It 
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should be the link between goals established and activities undertaken. Control refers to the 
process of binding operating officials to the policies and plans set by their superiors. Control is 
predominant during the execution and audit stages. 
Public budgeting is especially complex and has been evaluated on four dimensions (Hyde 
& Shafritz, 1978). First, as a political instrument, public budgeting is used to determine the most 
appropriate allocation of scarce public resources among various social and economic needs. 
Second, as a managerial or administrative instrument, public budgeting specifies the ways and 
means of providing public programs and services. Additionally, it establishes the costs and 
criteria by which activities are evaluated for efficiency and effectiveness. Third, as an economic 
instrument, public budgeting can direct a nation’s or state’s economic growth and development, 
since it is a tool used to redistribute income, stimulate growth, promote full employment, combat 
inflation, and maintain economic stability. Finally, as an accounting instrument, public budgeting 
is used as a means of holding governmental officials, and governments in the aggregate, 
responsible for the expenditure of the funds with which they have been entrusted. 
Cozetto, Kweit, and Kweit (1995) identified five major budgetary decision-making 
approaches that have been adopted throughout the history of budgeting in the United States. 
These five approaches are line-item budgeting, performance budgeting, planning and 
programming budgeting (PPB), zero-based budgeting (ZBB), and outcome-based or target based 
budgeting (also known as New Performance Budgets or NPB). In addition to reviewing these 
five approaches to public budgeting, the researcher evaluated the Balanced Scorecard (BSC).  
 10
Line-Item Budgetary Model  
The line-item budget is the most basic and traditional type of budget format (Cozzetto et 
al., 1995). Also known as the object-of-expenditure classification (Mikesell, 1999), this type of 
budget is appropriately named because each item of each program is listed along with the 
associated expenditure (Cozzetto et al, 1995.). Line-item budgeting was initiated during the early 
part of the 20th century and was one of the first types of budgeting systems introduced into 
government. It has been used extensively at all levels of government, as well as in the private 
sector. The standard of budgeting in the public sector has long been the traditional line-item 
budget (Moylan, 1995). This format serves as the basic structure for budget development in that 
it has become the template that many agencies use for estimating the cost of carrying out plans 
for service. Most other budget classifications begin from some type of line-item basis (Mikesell, 
1999). It is the building block for budget cost estimates, after it has been determined what the 
agency wants to do, and provides the focus for the control structures of government operation 
(Lynch, 1995). 
The measurement focus of line-item budgets is on inputs to the flow of service provision 
(Mikesell, 1999; Moylan, 1995). Its purpose is to identify the cost of specific materials and 
services. Usually little descriptive information justifying the expenditures is provided. In other 
words, the focus is on the resources (i.e., labor, equipment, supplies) that the government 
purchases, whether directly from its suppliers or indirectly through transfer-subsidy-loan 
programs. 
In a line-item budget, particular components of an organization are identified, and a 
particular allocation of money is specified, with no connection to the program or the expected 
outcomes produced by an organization (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). The emphasis is on purchase 
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type, such as personnel, office supplies and equipment, utilities, or contractual services. 
According to Cozzetto et al.(1995), line-item budgets were initially used because the role of the 
budget was to control and account for expenditures of public monies. The line-item budget was 
developed in response to a government reform movement to stop, or at least control, fraud and 
abuse in government spending (Lynch, 1995; Martin, 2000).  
The strength of input measures, which are emphasized in line-item budgeting, is that they 
provide a detailed classification of the scope and level of resource consumption for legislative 
review and managerial decision-making. In addition, line-item measures can be used as the basis 
for many other types of performance measures such as the creation of efficiency measures that 
are adopted in many subsequent measurement models. By nature, input measures are simplistic, 
making them easy to understand, develop, and use. For example, some of the particular strengths 
of line-item budgets are that they allow for easy comparisons between previous year and current 
year expenditures, they are easily understood by the layperson, and they allow for a high degree 
of control over expenditures (Cozzetto et. al., 1995).  
One of the major weaknesses of input measures is that they do not consider subsequent 
actions such as goals achieved, outcomes attained, or output produced (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). 
These measures simply explain the various categories where resources have been consumed in 
the production of services. Another weakness is that they provide little in the way of long-term 
planning. Additionally, they do not address the rationale for the allocation of resources to any 
specific program. Furthermore, line-item budgets provide little narrative to tie expenditures to 
performance criteria. Finally, it has been pointed out that line-item budgeting has no direct 
relationship to the cost of the utility provided by the program, nor does it reflect program goals 
(Moylan, 1995). For example, if the OSDBU used some form of line-item budgeting system, the 
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expenditures reflected in these categories would be organized or categorized by expenditure 
type, such as office supplies, rent, office hardware, furniture, and so on. 
Performance-Based Budgetary Models 
The concept of performance budget was introduced at the federal government level in 
1949 by the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of Government, also known 
as the “Hoover Commission” (Mikesell, 1999; Posner, 1997; Seckler-Hudson, 1978). One of this 
commission’s major recommendations was for the federal government to replace the line-item 
budget format with the performance budget (Cozzetto et. al., 1995), which is prepared on the 
basis of the functions and objectives of governmental agencies and departments, rather than 
exclusively on the basis of objects of expenditure and organizational units (Seckler-Hudson, 
1978). 
As opposed to the inputs reflected in line-item budgets, performance budgets emphasize 
agency-activity performance objectives and accomplishments (Cozzetto et. al., 1995; Mikesell, 
1999). These budgets were initiated as a means of shifting the focus away from the inputs of 
government and towards the functions, activities, costs, and accomplishments of government 
(Posner, 1997). In other words, the focus was accomplishments, ends, outputs, or planned 
agency-activity performance objectives (Mikesell; Moylan, 1995; Seckler-Hudson, 1978). This 
focus on the use of output and activity measures in performance budgeting serves the dual 
purpose of allowing elected officials to define policy objectives and designing budgets to 
accomplish those objectives rather than focusing on allocating resources at the agency level 
(Cozetto et. al., 1995; Mikesell, 1999). This particular type of performance model relates groups 
of expenditures or “activity classifications” to a larger mission (Cozzetto et. al., 1995), such as 
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consumer output or contribution to public objectives. Therefore, in the performance budget, the 
single most important task is the precise definition of the work to be done and a careful 
estimation of what that work will cost (Seckler-Hudson, 1978).  
The essence of performance budgets is that the budget should be tied to programs in 
order to provide an easier basis for policy-making (Emmerich & McLean, 1978; Mikesell, 1999). 
One of the major characteristics of performance budgeting is that allocations of money are tied to 
specific program outputs, which is consistent with the search for efficiency through maximizing 
results from inputs (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). Mikesell (1999) indicated: 
The performance classification promises better services at lower costs from more 
accountable officials; improved legislative review as attention and debate shift away from 
issues of personnel, salaries, supplier contracts, and the like, toward activity issues more 
related to how resources are used; and centralized decision making, allowing top 
management to concentrate its attention on policy matters. (p. 186)  
In other words, performance budgets link costs with activities, and this linkage permits unit-cost 
comparisons across agencies and over time within agencies, thereby representing changes, 
whether improvements or declines, in operating efficiency. 
The performance budget is intended to show the results of government spending and 
thereby to relate past performance to future policy objectives (Emmerich & McLean, 1978). 
Performance budgets also have some special, unique implications (Mikesell, 1999). For this type 
of budget structure, the budgetary decision-making power should always be placed with the 
central management agencies such as CEO offices for the development and implementation of 
performance measurement design and performance control. Also, the process of performance 
budgeting often involves a re-analysis of top functions and a reconsideration of the appropriation 
process by the legislature (Emmerich & McLean, 1978). 
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Cozzetto et al. (1995) discussed the strengths of performance budgets. First, performance 
budgets facilitate more comprehensive decision-making, including allocation and performance 
criteria. Second, performance budgets expedite the appropriations process, because the amount 
of detailed cost information is reduced compared to the line-item approach. Third, these budgets 
allow for internal managerial control over budget and performance guidelines as opposed to 
control from a central agency. Finally, these budgets become important evaluation tools.  
Due to these strengths, performance budgeting grew to become a key management tool 
for the 1990s (Moylan, 1995). Nonetheless, there were differing perceptions across the branches 
of government regarding the extent and the success of performance budget implementation 
(Willoughby & Melkers, 1998). Though performance budgeting allowed for comparisons 
between programs and within programs (e.g., comparison to the previous year’s performance), it 
also enabled management to periodically review work processes so that inefficiencies could be 
improved. Finally, it facilitated the challenge of “doing more with less.” Linking budgets to 
performance gained momentum from calls to “reengineer” business and to “reinvent” 
government in the early 1990s (Burke, Modarresi, & Serban, 1999).  
In the 1980s and 1990s management saw different trends, such as management by 
objectives (MBO) and Total Quality Management (TQM), which are models that emphasize 
performance. These initiatives are in direct contrast to previous models, which emphasized 
compliance. Thus, advocates of management by results tend to emphasize performance, while 
advocates of control by regulation emphasize compliance, and all of these tendencies fueled the 
performance budgeting trend.  
Performance budgets have several major limitations. First, it is difficult to adequately 
assess program outputs, thereby making the evaluation of overall program performance 
 15
problematic (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). This evaluation is more difficult for public agencies, which 
cannot simply look at profit measures as commercial entities do. Second, the entire process is 
very long and arduous because of the level of staff involvement and commitment (Moylan, 
1995). There must be an accompanying reorganization of the administrative agencies to match 
programs so that program costs can be translated to administrative-unit appropriations. Without 
this alignment, the program budget format “yields numbers that are not usable by budget 
decision-makers and choices will continue to be made in the familiar setting of the traditional 
(line-item) budgets” (Mikesell, 1999, p. 186). As Mikesell pointed out, many agency managers 
do not like performance budgets because the nature of this budgeting system exposes the agency 
to increased scrutiny by external parties such as taxpayers and legislators. Additionally, 
legislatures must change their review and appropriations procedures to a system that has no 
apparent linkage to revenue and budget balancing, making it more difficult to measure and more 
difficult to respond to the demands of citizens. Furthermore, performance budgets do not ask 
whether the performance being measured is the service the public actually wants (Mikesell, 
1999).  
Once again, using the OSDBU as an example, instead of simply categorizing 
expenditures by function, these expenditures would be categorized by goal achieved. For 
example, if the goal were to serve 200 women-owned businesses in the state of Florida per fiscal 
year, then the cost for serving these businesses would be calculated as a cost per business served.  
Planning, Programming Budgetary Models 
Planning, Programming, Budgeting Systems (PPBS or PPB) represent another step on the 
road towards budget reform. These types of measurement systems focus on the relationship of 
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inputs to outputs and emphasize outcomes. Based on the premise that data are to be organized 
around programs, the budget categories are compiled using a line-item system and the inputs are 
allocated to particular programs, as opposed to line items within an entire agency. These systems 
essentially combine the control orientation found in line-item budgets with the management 
orientation found in performance budgets (Mikesell, 1999), resulting in the planning oriented 
PPBS model. 
Mandated across the federal government in 1965 by President Lyndon B. Johnson 
(Posner, 1997), PPBS was seen as a means of improving major program decisions in operating 
agencies (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 1968). In general, different levels and types of performance 
could be arrayed, quantified, and analyzed to make the best budgetary decisions. PPBS provides 
for identification of program issues and consideration of such issues in the framework of a 
program structure. Therefore, the main difference between Program Budgeting and PPBS is that 
the former promotes managerial discretion and the development of performance indicators to 
assist with program evaluation while the latter emphasizes long-term planning, the use of 
sophisticated quantitative analysis to assist with resource allocation decisions, and 
standardization of the process across federal agencies. 
As stated by Wildavsky (1979), PPBS basically compares consequences horizontally 
across all major programs. PPBS provides for identification of program issues and consideration 
of such issues in the framework of a program structure. It requires a structure where all policies 
related to common objectives are compared for cost and effectiveness. The system has three 
basic elements: Program memoranda, Special Analytic Studies, and Program and Financial Plans 
(Hyde & Shafritz, 1978). Program memoranda provide the documentation for the strategic 
decisions recommended for the budget year. The special analytic studies provide the analytic 
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groundwork for the decisions reflected in the program memoranda. Program and financial plans 
provide a continuing record from year to year of the output, costs, and financing of all agency 
programs.  
Each branch of government has its own set of perceptions of PPBS. The various branches 
perceive the extent that PPBS is being implemented differently, and they perceive the level of 
success associated with implementation differently, as well (Willoughby & Melkers, 1998). 
Analysis showed that states with better-known PPBS systems have not necessarily realized 
greater success in terms of effectiveness from this type of budget reform than states with less 
popularly known systems. By implementing a PPBS system, agencies will not necessarily see 
actual changes in spending amounts. Most of the changes that will be experienced at the agency 
due to the implementation of a PPBS system will be expressed in the way that the agency is 
managed. 
One of the major strengths of PPBS is that it ties expenditures to agency goals, which are 
usually rooted in specific programs (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). A second strength is that it 
incorporates useful quantitative tools. A third strength is that it relates expenditures to long-term 
planning and provides a mechanism for accountability.  
One of the major weaknesses of PPBS is that PPBS strategies successful for fund 
allocation for the national defense may not be met with the similar level of success for civilian 
programs due to the differences in goal-setting, decision-making, and service delivery structure 
in these organizations. Another major weakness is that PPBS is extremely complex, making it 
difficult to be effectively implemented. This difficulty arises because it creates a strong demand 
for the technical capabilities of budgetary agencies and staff. Program budgets also require new 
guidelines and extra effort by all involved parties (including legislatures, lobbyists, and 
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government departments). Therefore, based on the researcher’s experience in management, 
unless all parties actually want the new format and are willing to put the necessary time into 
learning the new format, it will be ignored in favor of more traditional formats.  
The sheer complexity of PPBS causes several other negative situations to arise. For one, 
the proper use of PPBS requires specific training for budget analysts, often causing adequately 
trained budget analysts to be in short supply. A second weakness is that it produces voluminous 
amounts of data that can overwhelm the system. Furthermore, the complexity of this type of 
budgeting system fosters budget games and financial mismanagement (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). 
Finally, as stated by Wildavsky (1979), “Program budgeting has not succeeded anywhere in the 
world it was tried. It has failed because its cognitive requirements—relating causes to 
consequences in all important areas of policy—are beyond individual or collective human 
capacity” (p. 179).  
To continue with our example: If the OSDBU agency implemented a type of PPBS, all 
budgeted expenditures would be distributed across the various programs within the agency. For 
instance, all expenditures for salaries, supplies, and rent would be spread across the various 
programs within the agency. The total cost for each program would then be tabulated so that the 
total cost for each program could be calculated and distributed accordingly across the 
expenditure categories.  
Zero-Based Budgetary Models 
Whereas program budgeting compares consequences and results across all major 
programs (horizontally), zero-based budgeting compares consequences and results within each 
program (vertically) by starting from scratch each year (Wildavsky, 1979). Former President 
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Jimmy Carter implemented zero-base budgeting (ZBB) at the federal level during his presidency 
(Mikesell, 1999; Posner, 1997). ZBB was designed as a holistic management package, 
integrating planning, operational strategies, resource allocation, and evaluation at all 
organizational levels. ZBB demands a re-justification of the entire budget submission from 
ground zero each year, and each agency is required to defend its entire budget annually with no 
presumption that the agency will receive at least its prior-year appropriation. Consequently, the 
beginning point for each subsequent year is zero and each program requires analysis and 
justification each year (Mikesell, 1999). The main focus of ZBB is optimizing accomplishments 
or outcomes available at various alternative budgetary levels (Posner, 1997). Stated another way, 
ZBB is a system that requires agencies to prioritize their entire budget each year (Mikesell, 
1999). For example, an agency would project levels of outcome if funded at $2 million versus 
being funded at $1 million. 
This re-justification of the entire budget submission each year from ground zero is in 
contrast to the systems that were presented thus far that emphasize incremental changes in 
budgetary decisions. Incremental budgeting systems essentially respect the outcomes of previous 
budgetary decisions and focus examination on the margin of change from year to year (Hyde & 
Shafritz, 1978). Therefore, ZBB is first and foremost a refutation of the incremental nature of 
budgeting processes. 
ZBB focuses on the concept of funding priorities. These priorities should reflect a 
concern about the projects or activities that governments do. These projects or activities should 
be prioritized for agencies to make funding decisions (Hyde & Shafritz, 1978, p. 219). ZBB 
involves five fundamental steps that are used in its application (Cozzetto et. al., 1995). The first 
step is to prepare “decision units,” which are activity centers, either program-specific or agency-
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wide, that fall under the direction of a manager. The second step is to analyze each decision unit 
within a “decision package.” The third step is to rank decision packages. Fourth, operating 
budgets must be developed based upon approved decision packages. Fifth, management must 
evaluate and review the ongoing progress with respect to financial expenditures, as well as 
program implementation. 
ZBB is characterized by numerous strengths (Cozzetto et. al., 1995; Mikesell, 1999). 
First, it is a management-oriented approach to budgeting that uses standard processes on a 
system-wide basis. ZBB also presents alternative strategies and describes the effects of various 
methods of implementation. Additionally, when using ZBB, existing and new programs receive 
the same level of scrutiny, thereby preventing bias caused by program familiarity. Furthermore, 
ZBB presents the various ramifications of increases and decreases in funding levels and 
integrates short-term planning with long-term planning. Finally, ZBB facilitates identification of 
duplication within the organization. 
Despite the many strengths of ZBB, there are three major limitations that hindered its 
widespread acceptance and use (Cozzetto et. al., 1995; Mikesell 1999). First, there is a demand 
for the development of decision packages and the process can be very time-consuming. Second, 
like PPBS, the original form of ZBB is too complex, making it difficult to manage the process 
and data needed. Third, since there is no guarantee of program continuity, the technical 
presentation of the ZBB makes it difficult for the legislature to accept and use it. 
If the OSDBU were required to utilize a ZBB plan, each program and activity, and all 
subsequent expenditures provided by the agency, would have to be justified each year if any 
funds were to be allocated for that purpose. For example, suppose that OSDBU Agency had a 
program that was established to help business owners write effective business plans and 
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proposals so that they could secure financing through loans, grants, and contracts. During the 
first year, this program might receive a substantial amount of money to cover start-up and other 
initial costs and operating expenses without the program’s being undercapitalized. Initially, there 
might also be a high level of demand for these services. However, during the second year of the 
program, funding might be cut significantly because this program may not be the priority of 
legislative consideration for funding.  
Outcome-Based Performance Budgetary Models 
Outcome-based performance budgets, also known as new performance budgets (NPB), 
emphasize program impacts and results in budgetary decision making (Rossi & Freemen, 1989), 
reflecting the efforts to move budget processes from an input focus to a more results-oriented or 
outcome-oriented focus (Joyce, 1993; Martin, 2000; Mercer 2002; Mikesell, 1999; Posner, 1997; 
Walker, 2002). NPB essentially define all activities, direct and indirect, required by a program 
for support, in addition to estimating activity costs.  
NPB involves efforts to link resources to results and is viewed as a specific type of 
analysis that focuses strictly on outcomes (Martin, 1997; Mercer, 2002; Walker, 2002). By 
definition, NPB is an integrated annual performance plan and annual budget that shows the 
relationship between program funding levels and expected results by identifying the relationships 
between dollars and results, as well as explaining how those relationships are created (Mercer, 
2002). NPB, therefore, presents a general indication of how dollars are expected to generate 
results, which facilitates resource allocation decisions by suggesting the potential effect of 
budget increases and decreases. This type of outcome-based assessment is especially useful in 
the human-services–contracting arena. It is used to conduct program evaluations that attempt to 
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determine or verify accountability by measuring and evaluating the end results of government 
programs, rather than by monitoring inputs and processes (Dicke & Ott, 1999).  
NPB is a valuable diagnostic tool for developing a fundamental understanding of the 
integration between resources applied and performance achieved (Wang, 2002b). Once created, a 
performance budget may become the foundation for building a comprehensive performance 
management system that is a crucial part of the agency-wide overall strategic plan. A well-
crafted performance budget provides agency managers with a starting point for monitoring 
organizational performance.  
Social indicators have also been shown to play a role in this type of results-oriented 
budget system (Aristigueta, Cooksy, & Nelson, 2001). Just as agency performance indicators 
reflect the level of program outcomes experienced, social performance indicators allow 
researchers to monitor the general well-being of society at large. Performance measures have 
been shown to be better at measuring program activities and outputs than measuring outcomes, 
which are much more difficult to measure (Berman, 2002). One disadvantage to using these 
measures is that implementing an inadequate performance measurement system can provide a 
false sense of security and accomplishment, subsequently leading to misdirected resources and 
activities (Bouckaert & Peters, 2002). 
The underlying process involved in NPB begins with agencies’ identifying the outputs 
and outcomes that are to be produced by their programs (Mikesell, 1999). Based on these outputs 
and outcomes, performance targets are set and budget requests are made. The agency heads are 
then accountable for achieving those results without micromanagement of the inputs. 
Martin (1997) sought to define outcome budgeting. He found outcome budgeting to be 
different from such traditional budgeting systems as PPB and performance budgeting, because 
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outcome budgeting involves a specific type of analysis that focuses strictly on outcomes. He 
stated that outcome budgeting appeared “to be a logical response to the pace of change, the 
desire for government managers and administrators to become more innovative and 
entrepreneurial, the devolution of government decision-making and authority, and the demand 
for more government accountability for results” (p. 112). Martin went on to say that the 
implementation of outcome budgeting can be thought of as involving at least two major 
decisions. The first decision is the selection of a basic approach. The second decision is the 
selection of a level of analysis. Martin (1997) concluded by stating that while outcome budgeting 
does bear “a resemblance to performance or functional budgeting, it is sufficiently different to 
constitute a new species of budgeting system” (p. 123).  
NPB differs from such traditional budgeting systems as PPBS, management by objectives 
(MBO), and traditional performance budgeting in that it involves a specific type of analysis that 
focuses on outcomes and effectiveness (Martin, 1997). This type of budgeting system appears to 
be a direct result of today's dynamic and unpredictable environment. It allows government 
managers and administrators to be more innovative and entrepreneurial in the way that they run 
their agencies and programs. It also provides the necessary accountability, while allowing 
enough flexibility for the appropriate devolution of decision-making and authority. NPB can 
further be described as involving a special type of analysis, which can be classified as the 
analysis of results, accomplishments, or impacts (Martin, 2000). The primary target audience for 
NPB is external stakeholders, which include elected officials, citizens, advocacy groups, and 
others. 
NPB has also been described as an integrated annual performance plan and annual budget 
that shows the relationship between program funding levels and expected results (Mercer, 2002). 
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As an effective budgeting mechanism, NPB can be used to identify the relationships between 
dollars and results, as well as to explain how those relationships are created. NPB can be used to 
identify these relationships since NPB defines all activities, direct and indirect, required by a 
program for support, in addition to estimating activity costs. For example, NPB can be used to 
produce an estimation of how dollars are expected to generate results. In turn, this information 
facilitates resource-allocation decisions by suggesting the potential effect of budget increases and 
decreases. Additionally, performance budgeting is a valuable diagnostic tool for developing a 
fundamental understanding of the integration between resources applied and performance 
achieved. 
One of the major strengths of NPB is that it can be used to help enhance the 
government’s capacity to assess competing claims in the budget by arming budgetary decision-
makers with better information on the results of both individual programs as well as entire 
portfolios of tools and programs addressing common performance outcomes (Walker, 2002). An 
additional strength of NPB is that it provides an important tool for assessing how spending 
changes affect results. NPB can also be used as the foundation for the structure of program 
outputs and performance goals. NPB is also invaluable in facilitating increased communication 
between managers and employees because it is a simultaneous top-down and bottom-up process 
(Mercer, 2002).  
Despite challenges, NPB is achievable at the federal level, particularly now that the 
requisite management reforms emphasizing accountability are in place (Mercer, 2002). NPB is 
an ongoing process that involves every manager within an agency, from an agency head to 
individual managers of programs and organizations within an agency. This level of involvement 
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should foster more understanding and acceptance of the system within the various ranks of 
management. 
Though widely accepted as a promising tool in facilitating the reforms sought within 
today’s government, NPB has been criticized for its inability to bring about fundamental changes 
in actual budget outcomes (Halachmi 1997; Joyce, 1993). Proponents of NPB cite its potential to 
bring about basic change in the resource-allocation process by using performance measures as 
the primary means of allocating government resources. Use of this type of system would require 
a transformation of most current budget allocation processes, which are heavily focused on 
inputs, to outcome-oriented systems, which primarily focus on expected results. 
Another major limitation is that, by focusing on the results of specific programs, 
stakeholders may lose sight of what the overall goals of their organizations should be, such as 
increased quality of life, and focus on more short-term, measurable goals. Losing sight of overall 
goals will cause stakeholders to shift the focus of their resource-allocation processes away from 
inputs and towards expected results. Therefore programs that have a more long-term–oriented 
focus might get shortchanged because of the amount of time that it would take to yield 
measurable results. Correcting the situation so that programs with a long-term focus do not get 
shortchanged would require a complete overhaul of the way resources are currently allocated 
from an input focus to a results focus. 
There are other limitations associated with NPB, as well. For one, most government 
officials do not have enough experience to effectively utilize NPB (Cozzetto et. al., 1995, 
p. 213). Second, outcome measures will be difficult to compare because no standard 
measurements exist that will apply across various agencies. Third, there needs to be a strong 
consensus among elected officials, legislative bodies, and the general public regarding agency 
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objectives, which is often difficult. Fourth, most accounting systems used by the governmental 
agencies will have to be modified so that the information that they provide can be linked to 
outcomes, which is difficult to accomplish within a short period of time and without sufficient 
investment in technology. Fifth, many outcomes realized by agencies are largely out of their own 
control, making outcomes all the more difficult to measure. Sixth, legislatures cannot 
micromanage agencies and therefore cannot control the agencies’ outcomes (and 
micromanagement usually proves to be a problem). Seventh, audits cannot focus solely on 
financial measures. Obviously there are many limitations that must be considered when 
examining NPB. 
 If the OSDBU agency were to categorize its expenditures using a type of new 
performance budget, an example would be the number of small business–awarded prime 
contracts with a specified government agency charged to each organizational funding source. 
Another example is the amount of accounting costs that should be charged to each funding 
source. The outcomes can be measured as the number of woman-owned businesses that 
successfully submitted proposals to federal agencies and were awarded contracts as a direct 
result of the assistance that they received from the OSDBU Agency. Another way the OSDBU 
Agency could measure outcomes is by the number of businesses that received Small Business 
Association (SBA) loans as a result of their assistance. 
The Balanced Scorecard Model 
In 1990, the Nolan Norton Institute, the research division of KPMG, sponsored a one-
year multi-company study on the future of performance measurement (Kaplan & Norton, 1992). 
David Norton, CEO of Nolan Norton, was the study leader, and Professor Robert S. Kaplan of 
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the Harvard Business School served as an academic consultant. The dozen companies that 
formed the original study group believed that exclusive reliance on financial performance 
metrics was causing their companies to do the wrong things. This study explored new methods of 
performance measurement. 
Kaplan, Norton, and the representatives from the participating companies met bimonthly 
throughout 1990 to develop a new performance-measurement model. They began by analyzing 
case studies involving innovative performance-measurement systems. The ideas investigated 
included shareholder value, productivity and quality measurements, new compensation plans, 
and a “Corporate Scorecard” (Kaplan & Norton, 1996a, p. 119). This group decided that the 
scorecard was the most promising system and was therefore the most worthy of further 
investigation, including refining the model.  
The resulting Balanced Scorecard (BSC) model (see Figure 1) has been labeled one of the 
75 most influential ideas of the 20th century, according to Harvard Business Review (Niven, 
2002), and one that received much acclaim in the relevant literature (Hepworth, 1998). The 
model was made up of four perspectives—financial, customer, internal processes, and innovation 
and learning. BSC was significantly different from any existing performance-measurement 
system and therefore generated considerable excitement in the performance-measurement world. 
The unique quality of this model is the fact that this model struck a “balance” between leading 
and lagging indicators, short- and long-term objectives, and external and internal performance 
perspectives (Kaplan & Norton, 1992).  
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Figure 1. The Balanced Scorecard Model 
 
In 1992, Kaplan and Norton introduced the Balanced Scorecard. Known by the authors as 
the “strategy scorecard,” it is a management tool used to develop performance measurement 
standards in organizations. It provides executives with a comprehensive framework that 
translates a company’s vision and strategy into a strategy-driven set of performance measures 
(Kaplan & Norton, 1996c; Neely et. al., 2000). BSC basically is a method for translating an 
organization’s mission and strategy into a condensed set of performance measures (Helfrich & 
Filip, 2000; Maholland & Muetz, 2002). Therefore, the BSC was developed to be a holistic 
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strategic management system that wires every part of the organization to its strategy scorecard. 
BSC serves as a holistic model of strategy that allows employees to see how they are 
contributing to organizational success (Kanji & Moura, 2001).  
Following the development of the BSC model, Kaplan and Norton revised and improved 
the model as they observed it being used in practical situations. The evolution from being strictly 
a performance measurement tool to a strategic management system can be chronicled through 
subsequent Kaplan and Norton articles and books (Kaplan, 1994; Kaplan & Norton, 1992, 1993, 
1996a, 1996c, 1996d, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2004c). This development is explored more 
thoroughly in Chapter III.  
Further work with senior business executives led to experiences with the BSC that 
demonstrated that metrics spread across the four perspectives could effectively drive a single 
strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 1996d). Kaplan and Norton based this concept of four perspectives 
feeding from the overall organizational strategy and vision on the premise that the BSC could be 
used as the foundation for core managerial processes such as resource allocation, budgeting, 
planning, goal setting, and employee learning. 
Traditionally, most managers have exclusively focused their attention on financial 
measures, with managers in the manufacturing sector being one extreme example (Gosselin, 
2005). Conversely, the BSC is based on the premise that an exclusive reliance on financial 
measures in a management system is insufficient (Kaplan & Norton, 2001b) and that managers 
should aim to strike a balance between both financial and non-financial measures. Touted as 
being as useful as the more traditional framework of income statement, balance sheet, and 
statement of cash flows for financial planning and reporting (Kaplan & Norton, 1992), the BSC 
model was designed to bridge the missing gap between financial and non-financial measures. 
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Kaplan and Norton (2001c) developed the BSC as a means of helping organizations specify the 
critical elements necessary in implementing growth strategies.  
Financial measures have traditionally been used to evaluate performance in the private 
sector. One of the classic works involving the effects of reliance on accounting performance 
measures (RAPM) examined the effect of RAPM on job-related tension (JRT) (Hopwood, 1972). 
This study found that too much emphasis on accounting measures for performance evaluation 
resulted in increased JRT and dysfunctional behavior. Subsequently, Otley (1978) found 
conflicting results but suggested that the effects of RAPM in performance appraisal could be 
mitigated by the appropriateness of the budgetary measures of performance. In other words, the 
amount of JRT caused by RAPM is determined by the perceived fairness of the budget figures by 
which the employee is evaluated. These studies led to a large body of research concerning the 
relationships among systematic differences in the environment (Govindarajan, 1984).  
Kaplan conducted research for approximately one year and worked with 12 companies on 
the cutting edge of management practices to develop the BSC model. Kaplan and Norton (1992) 
described their model as “a set of measures that gives top managers a fast but comprehensive 
view of the business” (p. 71). More recently, it has also been proposed that a good scorecard 
measures process, products, and outcomes and reflects key values of both producers and 
customers (Lawton, 2002). Additionally, a good scorecard should be elastic and flexible enough 
to react to strategic changes caused by environmental turbulence (Laitinen, 2005). Therefore, a 
truly balanced scorecard aligns strategic objectives with customer priorities and should be used 
as a mechanism for strategy implementation, not strategy formulation (Kaplan & Norton, 1996c). 
Furthermore, by aligning the BSC with other organizational strategies such as customer 
priorities, SWOT analysis, and quality function deployment, the scorecard can be translated from 
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vague strategy into specific actions (Ip & Koo, 2004). This ability to align strategic objectives 
with customer priorities is especially important for public agencies, since a clause in the 
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 instructed federal agencies to 
“consult” with stakeholders during the strategic development process so that the agency could be 
more responsive to public interests (Franklin, 2000). 
For each perspective of the BSC, managers must identify the organization’s goals and 
objectives while simultaneously developing measures to achieve these goals. Additionally, 
cause-and-effect relationships must also be established among objectives and measures in all 
perspectives so that they can be managed and validated. To avoid information overload, the 
number of measures identified is limited to those that are most critical to organizational success. 
Managers must also be realistic about their expectations as to what performance measurement 
systems can and cannot do. By applying principles adapted from the physical sciences, managers 
must realize that uncertainty exists within the arena in which they operate (Palmer & Parker, 
2001). 
In addition to problems with performance measurement in general (Bouckaert & Peters, 
2002; De Lancer Julnes, 2001; Grizzle, 2002), problems were identified concerning the basic 
assumptions and relationships within the BSC (Hellein & Bowman, 2002; Norreklit, 2000). First, 
it was found that there was an interdependent relationship, as opposed to a causal relationship, 
between the perspectives within the BSC, thereby causing problems in strategy formulation. 
Another problem that was identified was a “gap” between the planned strategy and the actions 
actually undertaken (Norreklit, p. 75, 2000). In other words, strategy deployment had generally 
been ignored, resulting in implementation problems. Norreklit (2000) suggested that the 
implementation of a “coherent” set of performance measurements based on a coherent strategy 
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be used to alleviate these shortcomings (p. 82), with a coherent strategy being defined as one in 
which the properties of the different perspectives are “integrated and harmonized,” allowing the 
plans to be achieved through the working together of the properties of the different areas of focus 
(p. 84). Thus, “the implementation of a coherent set of performance measurements should be 
based on a coherent strategy” (p. 84).  
Other drawbacks have also been identified (KPMG, 2001). One asserted drawback is that 
the four perspectives are too limiting. There is a lack of consideration in the existing perspectives 
for knowledge-creation processes and intellectual capital. Some critics of the BSC have even 
suggested that a “human resource perspective” should be added to help the company focus on the 
performance drivers that originate from human capital. Additionally, the model has been 
criticized for having little focus on the external environment (KPMG). By not monitoring outside 
forces such as market and other competitive changes, the organization makes itself more 
susceptible to unexpected environmental fluctuations.  
Turning once again to the example using the OSDBU Agency, if the BSC were 
implemented, there would be specific goals under each of the four major areas—financial, 
customer, internal business processes, and learning and growth. Some examples of types of 
agency goals could be to decrease general operating expenses by 7%, increase the number of 
clients served by 10%, cut the amount of time that it takes to process a customer request by 15%, 
and to make sure that every client that was served during the past fiscal year would be contacted 
as a follow up. The budget is then allocated to activities related to accomplishing these goals. 
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Summary 
In this chapter, the development of budgetary formats over the past 100 years was 
examined (see Table 1). A chronicle of the progression of budgetary models from simple line-
item budgets to multifaceted measurement models such as the BSC was presented. A description 
of the BSC and its design were then discussed and its shortcomings were evaluated.  
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Table 1 
Budget Format Characteristics 
Budget format Measurement 
type 
Measurement 
emphasis 
Key 
organizational 
purposes 
Example(s) 
Line-Item Inputs Accountability Resource 
consumption 
control and 
budgetary 
accountability 
Amount spent 
on supplies; the 
number of 
employees per 
1,000 residents 
Performance Output  Efficiency  Efficiency 
Improvement 
Production and 
process control 
The number of 
clients served; 
the number of 
contracts 
secured 
Planning, 
Programming 
Budgets 
Outcomes Effectiveness Improvement of 
resource 
allocation 
decision making 
Percentage of 
total budget 
amount 
allocated to a 
particular 
program 
Zero-Based Output and 
outcomes 
Effectiveness Improvement of 
budgetary 
decision-making 
The amount for 
a program in 
each decision 
package 
New 
Performance 
Outcomes Effectiveness Improvement of 
organizational 
performance and 
accountability  
The number of 
healthy children 
in a specific 
jurisdiction 
Balanced 
Scorecard 
Financial/ 
Non-Financial 
Effectiveness Development of 
an integrated 
performance 
management 
system  
% of budget 
spent per 
strategic goal 
and others 
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Although the BSC was designed primarily for the commercial sector, by examining the 
existing literature and integrating the various findings, the researcher developed a new 
measurement model, the Modified Balanced Scorecard (MBSC) model. The improvement and 
adaptation of the original model is the purpose of this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER III 
THE MODIFIED BALANCED SCORECARD MODEL 
In this dissertation, existing budgetary measurement systems are examined and integrated 
to more accurately reflect the dimensions of performance measurement exhibited in the various 
microcosms of public organizations. With Kaplan and Norton’s Balanced Scorecard Model 
(BSC) as the latest in the evolution of these models, the existing literature is used to modify and 
further develop this model specifically for use in public organizations. This chapter explains the 
significance of this research. 
Trends in Performance Measurement 
Just as some parts of government are being reinvented, so is accountability being 
reinvented (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998). As the way the business of government is conducted 
changes, so does the role that accountability plays in that entire process. The trend towards 
increased accountability is joined by a simultaneous trend towards increased performance 
(Halachmi, 2002a). This increase in emphasis on accountability has caused most governmental 
organizations to institute some type of internal auditing process to measure performance and to 
provide a broader picture of what is going on in the organization (Gilmour & Jensen, 1998). 
Internal auditing presents a more multidimensional view than financial auditing, which looks at 
only one aspect of the organization. This new type of performance or operational auditing, used 
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in the public sector, thereby replaces financial auditing, used in the commercial sector, as the 
measure of success (Dittenhofer, 2001).  
Performance monitoring is not a tool that should be seen as an end in and of itself, and 
neither is performance assessment. Rather, both of these are tools that should be used as 
incremental steps in helping public managers be more accountable in their positions and improve 
public programs (Wholey & Hatry, 1992). Increased emphasis on accountability and reliance on 
performance or operational auditing are tools that should lead to performance management or 
effective governing for results (Hatry, 2002). Performance monitoring and assessment should 
help public managers and administrators specify relative service goals, expectations, and 
strategies, because they can foster increased communication among the various government 
stakeholders. For example, it helps legislators “articulate service goals and expectations in 
budget discussions” (Wang, 2002a, p. 31).  
Performance measurement is used in all stages of the budget cycle (Wang, 2000). 
Regardless of the type, a performance measurement system must simultaneously have validity, 
clarity, reliability, legitimacy, and functionality to be considered the appropriate tool to use in 
that particular situation (Bouckaert, 1993; Grizzle, 1985). Additionally, the system should be 
incremental in order to increase acceptance and help prevent errors in the budgeting process 
(Schick, 1994; White, 1994). Performance measurement systems tend to evolve over time (Clary, 
Eberstein, & Harlor, 2000) as performance measurements are used in all stages of the budget 
cycle (Wang, 2000). Finally, the administrative and political environment influences how the 
performance measurement system is defined and implemented (Clary et. al., 2000; Schick, 
1994). One of the biggest problems in evaluating performance measurement systems is the 
differing perceptions of use and success among the various “budget players” (Melkers & 
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Willoughby, 2001, p. 54). Therefore, the adequacy of the performance measures being proposed 
or used is largely situational (Brooks, 2002; Broom, 1995; Dinesh & Palmer, 1998; Parker, 
2000). 
While traditional financial performance measures are good at measuring how effective 
managers are at earning profits in past periods, there are a number of other ways of assessing 
organizational effectiveness other than the financial. Financial performance measures are lagging 
indicators of performance, involve only historical data, and use strictly financial data. These 
measures do not consider the positive effects of managerial duties that affect the future 
profitability of an organization. Focusing too much on results can cause employees to pursue 
activities or make decisions that are beneficial to the organization in the short term but 
detrimental in the long term. For example, from the researcher’s years of experience in project 
management, the forgoing of routine maintenance and repairs makes quarterly expenses seem 
lower but can result in major damage and the need for subsequent repairs. Focusing too much on 
results may also weaken employees’ commitment to democratic-constitutional values 
(Piotrowski & Rosenbloom, 2002).  
Other ways of assessing organizational effectiveness might include actions such as 
spending time and money to train employees or paying overtime to technicians in order to ensure 
greater customer satisfaction. These types of duties sometimes directly conflict with the idea of 
making more profit in the private sector or being cost efficient in the public sector during a 
specific period, as they can result in additional expenses incurred. Yet without these activities, an 
organization loses its ability to effectively compete or even function in today’s changing 
environment.  
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Effective performance measurement is a planning, budgeting, and accountability tool that 
should be used to effectively increase performance (Behn, 1995; Fischer, 1994). Humanistic 
concepts, such as benchmarking, continuous improvement, and participation are simply other 
types of organizational management theories that evolved throughout the 1980s and 1990s. The 
trend in performance measurement has moved away from simply looking at efficiency measures 
and toward the humanistic side of the organization. Additionally, there has been a call for a more 
systematic approach to performance measurement implementation (Frank & DeSouza, 2004), 
because so many fundamental questions remain regarding effective performance measurement 
implementation. These performance measurement tools should also be applied in order to avoid 
organizations’ being stagnant and unresponsive to today’s changing environment. (Kouzmin, 
Loffler, Klages, & Korac-Kakabadse, 1999). 
Other limitations of simply using financial performance measures have also been 
documented. While the assumption is sometimes made that the best indicator of future 
performance is past performance, this assumption is not necessarily true. Because of the 
historical nature of accounting data, financial measures can be lacking in predictive ability, as 
they do not measure the factors that contribute to improved future performance (Ittner & 
Larcker, 1998). By ignoring these factors and allowing managers to be rewarded for good short-
term performance only, management may actually be encouraging rewards for the incorrect 
behavior. Additionally, the effectiveness of the performance measurement tool is limited by the 
knowledge of the governmental manager using the tool (Streib, 2005). The effectiveness of the 
tool is also limited by other key elements within the tool itself, including the reliability and 
relevance of the performance data and cost data used within the tool (Pizzarella, 2004). 
Furthermore, some researchers feel that performance measurement is simply a form of 
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administrative idealism that is really not used as much as was once thought (Kelly, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the overwhelming motivation to use performance measures stems from a desire to 
make better decisions and to maintain accountability to citizens and other stakeholders, rather 
than from the need to meet reporting requirements (Poister & Streib, 1999). It has also been 
proven that the use of performance measurement impacts organizational efficiency, 
effectiveness, and accountability (Wang, 2000). With all of this being said, it is evident that one 
of the essential questions of the future will be how to move to full adoption and implementation 
of the citizen-drive, data-driven, decision-making (Holzer & Yang, 2004). 
Relying too much on financial measures for performance evaluation can also result in 
dysfunctional behavior of the subordinates being evaluated (Hirst, 1981, 1983; Hopwood, 1972; 
Tiessen & Waterhouse, 1983). Because financial performance measures fail to include all 
relevant dimensions of managerial performance in situations where high task and environmental 
uncertainty exists, managers may view these measures as unfair, leading to anxiety and job-
related tension (Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Weissenfeld & Killough, 1992). Additionally, it 
has been determined that the financial and economic dimensions of microfinance institutions (i.e. 
governmental agencies) can effectively be assessed using traditional measures. However, a BSC 
approach is necessary to evaluate the social objectives, as well as to accommodate the specific 
nature of microfinance institutions (Koveos & Randhawa, 2004).  
In the private sector, financial measures (for example, increasing revenues, decreasing 
costs, maximizing shareholder wealth) are the universally accepted indicators of success, and 
these measures ultimately determine the performance of the organization. Though some may 
argue that customer service is more important, based on the notion that satisfied customers will 
lead to financial performance, organizational survival depends on an organization’s ability to 
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satisfactorily meet its financial obligations. Regardless, there is no such universally accepted 
measure of success in the public sector. This is why Kaplan and Norton’s BSC, which was 
specifically designed for the private sector, should be modified. 
Public Interest Values and the Balanced Scorecard Model  
The BSC has been a major topic in performance measurement literature in recent years, 
with many articles focusing on the strategy involved in the implementation of the BSC 
(Bollinger, 2002; Frank & DeSouza, 2004; Frigo, 2002; Kaplan & Norton, 2001c; Sim & Koh, 
2001; Van Veen-Dirks & Wijn, 2002). Although non-financial measures such as those in a BSC 
are being used more and more in developing and deploying strategy (Amaratunga, Baldry, & 
Sarshar, 2001), one survey showed that financial measures are still the measures being focused 
on for performance evaluation (Frigo, 2002). Some studies explained how the BSC is being used 
in specific industries (Chang, Lin, & Northcott, 2002; Penney, 2002). Other research has focused 
on performance after the adoption of a BSC (Frigo, 2002; Hoque & James, 2000; Malina & 
Selto, 2001). Using time-series data, Banker, Potter, and Srinivasan (2000) demonstrated a 
significant link between non-financial measures and future performance, and also demonstrated 
that when incentives are tied to non-financial measures, future performance improves even more. 
A number of studies have discussed the advantages of developing a BSC for specific 
industries. The need for the BSC in healthcare administration worldwide was discussed by 
Forgione (1997). The advantages of the BSC in healthcare were also addressed by Chow, 
Ganulin, Haddad, and Williamson (1998). More recently, use of the BSC has been researched in 
academic institutions (Dorweiler & Yakhou, 2005), in the hotel industry (Evans, 2005), in 
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research and development firms (Bremser & Barsky, 2004), in libraries (Self, 2004), and in 
microfinance institutions (Koveos & Randhawa, 2004).  
Other important issues involving BSC model implementation in healthcare organizations 
have also been addressed. For example, with increased concern over public interests such as 
healthcare costs, Griffith and Pattullo (2000) recommended a BSC approach for integrated health 
systems, although they suggested eight major perspectives for this field due to the uniqueness of 
the population served.  
 Few studies have investigated the effectiveness of the BSC model as a performance 
measurement tool. Some studies have looked at various components of the BSC (Hoque & 
James, 2000; Johnsen, 2001). However, the reliability of this model compared to that of other 
tools already in use has not been evaluated. There may be inherent problems with using the BSC 
model because it uses multiple measures. Lipe and Salterio (2000) were the first to demonstrate a 
cognitive difficulty in using the BSC model, in that their results show that managers tended to 
evaluate their divisions on common measures only, with a disregard for measures that are unique 
to the division. When evaluating multiple business units, their study showed that superiors 
ignored unique measures for specific units and used only the common measures for determining 
performance. This bias can be reduced, however, if there is an assurance report over all measures 
and the evaluator is required to justify the evaluation to a superior (Libby, Salterio, & Webb, 
2002). 
Another study by Lipe and Salterio (2002) showed how people react differently 
depending on how the measures in a BSC are categorized. The amount of weight given to each 
variable is considerably different depending on whether the variable is grouped with other 
variables or listed separately where there is no clear relationship with other variables. 
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BSC was capable of capturing the value-creating activities from an organization’s 
intangible assets such as innovative products and services, customer loyalty and relationships, 
and employee skills and motivation. Kaplan and Norton contended (1992) that these assets could 
not be adequately valued through traditional financial measures alone. As the authors gained 
experience through the implementation of the BSC in over 200 various organizations (Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996a), they determined that it had evolved into an effective tool for organizations to 
implement and direct their strategies throughout their organizations. The BSC came to be seen as 
a system that provides real insight into an organization’s operations, balances the historical 
accuracy of financial numbers with the drivers of future performance, and assists in 
implementing strategy (Niven, 2002). As the BSC model has continued to grow and flourish, 
Kaplan and Norton have continued publishing papers on the subject (Kaplan, 2005; Kaplan & 
Norton, 1996a, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 1997a, 1997b, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c, 2001d, 2001e, 
2004a, 2004b, 2004c).  
The research on the BSC since its inception has been vast, though most of it has 
concentrated on either the implementation or the effects of implementing a BSC (Helfrich & 
Filip, 2000; Lawton, 2002). When being used as a tool in the governmental sector, the BSC 
measures are often used to support various other management functions and are often applied to 
other models. One such model is the environmental scanning model, also known as SWOT 
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis (Lee & Ko, 2000). The BSC model has 
also been applied to the McKinsey 7-S model, which was developed by Tom Peters and Robert 
Waterman (1982). This model basically describes the seven factors critical for effective strategy 
execution. Only a few projects have studied the BSC as a performance measurement tool 
(Banker et al., 2000; Libby et al., 2002; Lipe & Salterio, 2000). Some suggested areas of further 
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research include the use of subjective versus objective measurements, the effects of using broad 
sets of metrics in performance measurement systems, and determining what “balance” is in the 
BSC (Ittner & Larcker, 1998). Other researchers have called for an assessment of long-term 
impacts, as opposed to stand-alone process measures such as outcome measures (Voytek et al., 
2004). 
The MBSC Model 
When the BSC was developed, it was significantly different from any existing 
performance measurement system in existence. This evolutionary performance measurement 
model brought researchers a few steps closer to answering the age-old questions regarding what 
to measure, how definitions and techniques are chosen, and how they are linked to other aspects 
of an organization’s structure (Chan, 2004). Over the years, a variety of applications and an 
assortment of variations have emerged, and much has been written about the BSC and its 
penetration into mainstream performance measurement and management systems.  
Developed in 1992, the BSC was proposed as a means of summarizing the variety of 
benchmarks that businesses must satisfy in order to be successful in an increasingly competitive 
world. Furthermore, Kaplan and Norton (2001b) found that many organizations have a strategic 
planning group that focuses on developing long-range plans and a business planning group that 
independently develops operating and capital plans. This independence has resulted in over sixty 
percent of organizations not having a link between their budgets and their strategies (Kaplan & 
Norton, 2001d). Linking budget and strategy can be accomplished by using the BSC to guide 
organizations to results by integrating the organization’s strategy throughout its functioning.  
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Kaplan and Norton (1992) contended that the BSC should play a major role in the 
budgeting process in that it should be the tool on which spending decisions should be based. 
They argued that there were basically two budgets within an organization, the operational budget 
and the strategic budget. The operational budget consists primarily of non-discretionary spending 
and expenses that are determined by the level of current operations necessary to provide the mix 
of goods and services that sustains the organization. The strategic budget involves the spending 
necessary to support future organizational growth. By dividing the budget this way, discretionary 
spending can be limited to initiatives that drive future performance and are linked to the 
organization’s strategy. The BSC is the link between these processes, enabling managers to 
effectively manage both tactics and strategies. 
Another approach to budgeting is to use the BSC to develop budgets that use strategy as 
the center of the process. Niven (2002) suggested a budgeting process whereby spending is 
focused on achieving specific strategic objectives, as opposed to simply modifying the previous 
year’s budget. This approach is different from the one proposed by Kaplan and Norton (1997b) 
in that only one budget encompassing both operational and strategic initiatives is created. This 
approach forces everyone within an organization to constantly remain aware of the 
organizational strategy and the drivers of long-term performance.  
The proposed Modified Balanced Scorecard (MBSC) model (see Figure 2) is based on 
five perspectives, as opposed to the original model which has four. Each of these perspectives 
will vary from sector to sector, as well as from organization to organization. The “learning and 
growth” and “internal management processes” perspectives will be most similar for all 
organizations. The “financial accountability,” “client perspective,” and especially the “public 
good” perspectives will basically be different. This is due to the inherent differences between the 
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public sector and the private sector. The goal of private organizations is measured by 
profitability, whereas that of public organizations is measured by their contribution to the 
provision of public goods . Clients of public services do not directly pay for many services that 
they receive from public organizations whereas customers (clients) of private organizations do 
pay for the most of goods and services they receive. Private organizations report mainly to their 
private stakeholders, while public organizations respond to a broader range of stakeholder groups 
including citizens, public interest groups, and legislative bodies. 
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Figure 2. Modified Balanced Scorecard Model  
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Perspectives Most Similar Between the Two Models  
Internal Management Processes  
The “internal management processes” dimension of both the BSC and MBSC models 
incorporates the measures related to business processes that have the most significant impact on 
the day-to-day operations of the business. All organizations should strive to develop internal 
mechanisms for assessing performance that inspire managerial thinking, thereby leading to 
increased performance (Ammons, 2002). These internal management processes define the 
administrative processes and provide the structure necessary to conduct operations. In both the 
public and private sectors, these processes have an influence on the system that is ultimately used 
(Clary et. al., 2000).  
There is a set of general management functions that summarizes the work of a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), regardless of the sector. The list appeared in Luther Gulick’s classic 
essay, Notes on the Theory of Organization (Gulick, 1937) and included planning, organizing, 
staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting. Whether the manager is functioning in 
the public or private arena, the challenge is to integrate all of these functions in a way that 
maximizes results. 
In both sectors, it is important that performance be empirically studied; however the 
results of these studies should not simply categorize and describe management behavior. In the 
field of management, effectiveness needs to be studied for the purpose of improving the 
performance of managers (Cohen, 1993).  
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For the Office of Supplier Diversity and Business Utilization (OSDBU), management 
functions include activities such as assisting client firms in obtaining contracts and subcontracts 
with NASA and its prime contractors and developing and presenting courses such as Training 
and Development for Small Businesses in Advanced Technologies (TADSBAT). The relative 
measures would typically relate to the number of clients processed per week or the number of 
participants attending a training course given by the OSDBU. Another example is examining 
whether employees found a way to streamline the paperwork process associated with their 
activities, and any “best practices.” 
Learning and Growth  
The environment in both the public and private sector is very dynamic and changes at an 
increasingly rapid rate. Therefore, organizations must remain flexible and responsive to maintain 
their existence during these volatile times. In order to remain competitive, both public and 
private organizations must invest in their employees. To create a productive working 
environment in public institutions, managers must not only focus on the needs of the public, but 
also on the needs of each individual employee (Rector & Kleiner, 2002). Additionally, structures 
must be instituted that will motivate employees to work towards attainment of organizational 
goals. So in addition to training and development for its clients, employees of the OSDBU must 
keep abreast of changes and developments that affect both their clients and themselves. These 
changes include developmental activities such as updating technological skills, learning about 
changes within the legal and legislative environments, and general continuing education so that 
clients can get the highest quality assistance available. Therefore, the learning and growth 
dimensions are common to both the BSC and MBSC models. 
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Additional Similarities 
In both the private and public sectors, organizational strategy remains at the core of the 
BSC model (Niven, 2002; Venkatraman & Gering, 2000; Ziegenfuss, 2000). Strategy involves 
broad priorities that must be pursued in order to achieve the organization’s mission. These 
priorities must be consistent with the unique situational variables associated with the 
organization and its ability to effectively respond to threats and opportunities as they arise. The 
problem for public organizations is that these organizations often have a difficult time 
developing and conveying a clear, concise strategy (Kaplan & Norton, 2001b; Niven, 2002). 
First, public agencies often have considerable difficulty in clearly defining their strategies. This 
difficulty in defining strategies is partially due to the fact that components of performance in 
public and nonprofit organizations include not only the efficiency of operations and the 
satisfaction of constituents, but also the adequacy of agency funding and the attainment of 
agency goals (Brooks, 2002). Second, given that achieving financial success is not the primary 
objective for most public agencies, the scorecard must be altered and customers (or constituents) 
must be placed at the top of the hierarchy. 
Perspectives Most Different Between the Two Models 
The two perspectives discussed above—management processes and learning and 
growth—are common to both the public and the private sectors, and thus to both the BSC and the 
MBSC models. Additionally, all organizations, whether public or private, must consider 
financial aspects of managing their operations; therefore these perspectives will remain the same 
for both models. All organizations have internal business processes that allow for the smooth 
day-to-day operations necessary to conduct business. And all organizations have learning and 
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growth through various types of employee training and development, either in informal, on-the-
job-training, or structured courses in a formal class setting.  
The focus of this present research is on the three perspectives that are different in the 
public and private sectors, which then result in differences between the BSC and MBSC models. 
These differences provide the impetus for the development of the MBSC model and the study 
that provided the foundation for this dissertation. The development of this new model is the 
significant contribution this dissertation provides to the existing body of knowledge. In this 
dissertation, existing budgetary models are synthesized into the MBSC model, which are 
developed to evaluate the effectiveness of programs administered by federal governmental 
agencies (see Figure 2). The MBSC model includes input from both the stakeholders and 
customers/clients, thus reflecting the views of these often-opposing perspectives.  
While a crucial responsibility for public managers is to be held accountable for efficient 
decision making, administrative efficiency is not their ultimate purpose. Public servants work to 
serve a higher purpose to achieve organizational outcomes that are desirable to the public and 
can be measured quantitatively (Niven, 2002). Nevertheless, the effort to achieve and measure 
the public’s desired outcomes in the public organization is hindered by difficulties inherent in 
public organizations. One such difficulty is that it is often difficult to identify the customers and 
their true interests.   
Financial Accountability 
The general trend toward increased financial accountability started in the early 1990s 
with the passing of the CFO Act of 1990 (Riley, 1995). More recently, the Government 
Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA) was passed, resulting in a call for a more 
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widespread emphasis on accountability within the public sector, in addition to a general changing 
of the nature of performance measurement in government (Halachmi, 2002b; Hirschman, 2002). 
The GPRA of 1993 was signed into law by President Clinton and sought to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of federal programs by establishing a system to set goals for 
program performance and to measure program results (Halachmi, 2002b). Unfortunately, the 
optimism surrounding this legislation is not as strong as it was when it was initially enacted 
(Radin, 1998). As budgets become tighter and securing congressional funding becomes more 
competitive, public agencies and their associated programs must pay close attention to the 
bottom line. They must strive to stay within their budgetary constraints while generating the 
maximum level of output—clients served and contracts awarded. There has also been an 
increased emphasis on financial accountability in the private sector. In light of recent, highly 
publicized scandals involving illegal and unethical financial practices, it is possible that 
procedures, rules, and laws regarding financial accountability will become progressively more 
stringent.  
All financial measures are designed to measure one of two things: effectiveness (doing 
the right things) or efficiency (doing things right). The difference between financial measures 
within the public and private sectors is in the focus of the measures. The sole purpose for 
existence in the private arena is maximization of shareholder wealth and profits. Therefore, 
financial goal accountability is, by far, the single most important perspective within the private 
sector. The public sector is different because financial accountability serves a different purpose 
than it does in the private sector. Financial process accountability—as opposed to the financial 
goal accountability found within the private sector—is the most important perspective within the 
public sector (Niven, 2002). Financial process accountability emphasizes cost control. Public 
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officials have the additional burden of assessing the organization’s true purpose, in addition to 
counting inputs and outputs of the system. So even though public officials are accountable for 
the efficient allocation of funds, the officials usually serve an additional, higher purpose, such as 
the reduction of incidence of HIV or providing housing assistance to low-income families. 
Client Perspective 
In their original model, Kaplan and Norton (1996a) identified four categories into which 
customer concerns should be assessed. These categories included time, quality, performance-
and-service, and cost. An important point to bear in mind is that the researcher must be cognizant 
of the fact that management and customer perceptions of organizational performance often 
differ. That is why it is important to obtain feedback from customers to ensure that performance 
is being measured relative to customers’ concerns, standards, and satisfaction.  
The interests reflected in these measures were developed based on the preferences of 
clients (more commonly referred to as customers in the private sector) of profit-seeking or 
commercial organizations. These clients want specific services to be performed, they want these 
services to be provided in a timely manner, and they want these services to be provided with a 
reasonable level of quality. Since they are paying for these goods and services, the invisible hand 
(Smith, 1776, 1961) of our capitalistic society dictates that they have a right to these demands. 
However, this payment outlook is one of the inherent differences between customers or clients of 
public organizations and those of private organizations. The clients of public organizations often 
do not “pay” for their services, and if they do pay, the “price” is usually subsidized by taxpayer 
dollars (for example, public healthcare, food stamps, housing). Therefore, the citizens within an 
area pay taxes, which provide the necessary funding for the services and goods provided by 
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public entities. The clients are a subset of the citizens and are the specific citizens seeking or 
using the goods and services provided by the public entity. 
Additionally, there are often differences between the preferences of stakeholders on the 
one hand and customers/clients of public organizations on the other, and these differences can 
affect the perceptions of the levels of service rendered by public organizations. Therefore, the 
critical questions that must be answered by public officials before appropriate measures can be 
chosen are, “Who are our customers?” and “What is our value proposition in serving them?” 
(Niven, 2002; Sanger, 1998). These services also must be provided as efficiently as possible.  
Public Good: Policy 
Elected or other government officials include those individuals who are charged with the 
responsibility of running our public organizations. Whether they are elected politicians, 
appointed officials, or hired employees, they are all supposed to be accountable for using 
taxpayer dollars efficiently, effectively, and responsibly. For the purpose of this dissertation, this 
group will be called the “stakeholders.” They represent the body that addresses our public 
interest values. The basic assumptions of public interest values are derived from our democratic 
society and include, among other values, systematic governance, representational democracy, 
federalism, and capitalism (VanWart, 1998). In being responsible public administrators, those in 
power have an obligation to support and uphold these values. A MBSC model that has been 
properly executed should encompass several of these public interest values, thereby further 
defending the basic constitutional values. More specifically, a well designed MBSC should 
minimally encompass the public values of systematic governance (internal processes), 
representational democracy (the public good) and federalism (managers), while still reflecting 
55 
capitalism (financial perspective). Furthermore, a well-designed MBSC would protect the values 
of individualism and religious choice (clients, managers). 
When applying public interest values to public administrators, both elected officials and 
public servants, there are four basic underlying assumptions (VanWart, 1998). The first is that 
public officials should implement policy but not usurp the process or amass power. By this 
scorecard being balanced, it inherently distributes both the inputs and outputs used to assess 
whatever program is being evaluated. The second assumption is that public official should be 
both effective and efficient with the public’s resources, and the MBSC will account for that. 
Third, it supports the public’s right to know by serving as an assessment instrument that lets the 
public know how various programs are doing. Fourth, it supports the public’s right to be 
involved, because it allows for input for those members of the public that serve as clients and 
who can attest to their experiences in participating in a particular program or dealing with a 
particular agency. 
In efficiently serving our public interest values, public managers should be greatly 
concerned about cost, especially as the environment that these stakeholders function within 
becomes increasingly competitive and budgetary constraints become tighter and tighter. On the 
other side, cost is not a major concern for public clients who are receiving public services. For 
example, when a client such as a food-stamp recipient or a citizen receiving hurricane relief is 
seeking these services from an agency, he or she is not concerned with the cost of the program or 
its operations. He or she is concerned with receiving a high level of service. 
Finally, managers within public organizations have a dual set of responsibilities. First, 
they must provide the general administrative and supervisory functions that all managers 
perform, regardless of whether they are in the public or private sector. Also, all managers must 
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answer in various degrees of accountability to assorted governing bodies. However, managers in 
the public arena have the additional responsibility of satisfying other stakeholders, who 
sometimes have opposing views, such as citizens who want increasing levels of services (better 
schools and roads) and taxpayers who want to minimize their tax bills. Though managers within 
both public and private organizations are accountable to governing boards, the boards overseeing 
private organizations have the same consistent goal of other managers within the organization, 
namely the maximization of shareholder wealth through earning profits. 
The sharpest distinction between public and private management is a fundamental 
constitutional difference. In the private sector, decision-making powers of general management 
are concentrated and centralized in the upper echelons of an organization, which is composed of 
the owners and managers of the organization. In a very small organization, this could be one 
person such as an owner/president. In large organizations, this would encompass all of those 
persons on the organizational chart with a job title of supervisor on up to the CEO. In contrast, in 
the U.S. government, the functions of general management are constitutionally spread among 
competing institutions: the executive branch, the two houses of Congress, and the courts 
(Allison, 1996). Thus the power is shared by a number of individuals whose ambitions are set 
against one another. The goal of the separation of responsibilities is to preclude the exercise of 
arbitrary power. 
These officials must learn to dialogue with fellow professionals and elected officials in 
order to demonstrate the intelligent management of contradictory motives and forces (Roberts, 
2002). These political considerations must be carefully navigated, since they play a major role in 
defining and implementing the system that is ultimately adopted (Clary et al., 2000). 
Additionally, conducting this type of dialogue can help resolve the accountability paradox and 
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avoid the atrophy of personal responsibility and political authority. The accountability paradox is 
the situation faced by public officials wherein they have a personal responsibility to reach goals 
and to be ethical public servants, while also having the political authority to establish the goals 
for their organization. In other words, they establish the goals that they must reach.  
Research has shown that using a participatory approach in developing performance 
measurement standards generally facilitates more cooperation satisfaction among the participants 
(De Lancer Julnes, 2001; De Lancer Julnes & Holzer, 2001). Research also shows that the 
performance of governmental agencies may be enhanced by letting the agents select the 
performance measures in the scorecard themselves and by having the agents monitor themselves 
and each other (Johnsen, 2001). Additionally, using a performance-oriented approach for 
strategy formulation as opposed to the traditional approach allows for the development of an 
integrated, holistic performance measurement system that can be used as a performance 
management system (Kloot & Martin, 2000). Moreover, adding citizen engagement builds an 
even more effective means of community governance (Marshall, Wray, & Epstein, 1999), 
especially when more specific subjective indicators are used instead of general satisfaction when 
evaluating the level of service (Stipak, 1979). Though subjective measures of performance have 
not always been widely accepted, they do yield results that are statistically similar to those 
generated using objective measures (Parks, 1984). It has also been found that the multi-item 
measurement scales (e.g., BSC) generally perform better than single-item (i.e. financial) 
measurement scales (Ryzin, 2004).  
In the original model, Kaplan and Norton (1996a) did not really have to distinguish 
between the financial good and the organizational good because both perspectives are perfectly 
aligned in the private sector. They are not closely aligned in the public sector, which is why the 
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model should (or must) be modified. The MBSC addresses the deficiencies of the traditional 
measures that were developed for the private sector.  
Summary 
This chapter explored the history of performance measurement. The researcher reviewed 
the literature and presented a chronological progression of the evolution of performance 
measurement. Initial measures were based on line-item budgets, which are financial measures 
based strictly on inputs. The next major category of measures that were reviewed were 
performance budgets, which primarily are efficiency measures based on output. The third major 
category of measures were PPBS, which are effectiveness measures based on outcomes. The 
fourth major category of performance measures were zero-based budgets, which are also 
effectiveness measures based on output and outcomes. The fifth category of performance 
measures were new performance budgets, which are effectiveness measures based on outcomes. 
The culmination of these measures was the BSC, which is primarily the integration of both 
financial and non-financial measures and which represents a holistic strategic management 
system that measures overall effectiveness and efficiency.. 
The BSC, which was introduced by Kaplan and Norton in 1992, has grown to be one of 
the most widely used strategic management tools in the world. The BSC, which was developed 
primarily for use in the private sector, was extensively evaluated as a performance measurement 
tool and was modified into the MBSC, which is a model that has been customized for use 
specifically in the public sector.  
In Chapter IV, the details regarding the way this study was conducted are explored. More 
specifically, the preferences of public managers and their clients regarding the role of their 
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programs are explored. Data from both managers and clients are used to determine the specific 
performance measures that should be included in each perspective of the MBSC model. 
Additionally, indicators are examined to determine if any accurate predictors of preferences can 
be identified. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The literature regarding performance measurement preferences for federal managers and 
the clients of the programs that they administer is lacking and has not been well documented. 
The body of knowledge is virtually nonexistent and there is no empirical evidence. At least one 
study (Wang, 2002a) looked at performance measurement preferences of local officials. 
However, in this study, the researcher’s purpose was to determine if there was a preference for 
output or outcome measures, rather than looking at specific measures. Therefore, in this 
dissertation, the researcher explored the measurement preferences of stakeholders and clients of 
federal programs. This chapter outlines the methodology for conducting this study. The data 
collected in this study were used to determine the preferred performance perspectives of the 
public managers versus the preferred performance perspectives of the clients.  
As a reminder, the research questions were considered in this dissertation are as follows:  
 
1. What measures should be included in the MBSC model? 
2. What are the stakeholders’ preferences for the measures? 
3. What determines stakeholders’ preferences for the measures? 
Model Overview 
The MBSC model developed in this dissertation was used as the framework for 
determining the performance measurement preferences of federal managers and the clients of 
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their programs. The model is based on five perspectives that were developed to give a balanced 
assessment of a public organization, without an over-reliance on financial measures. Each of 
these perspectives will vary from sector to sector, as well as from organization to organization. 
However, the general model includes a financial perspective, a learning and growth perspective, 
an internal management processes perspective, a client perspective, and a public good 
perspective.  
Research Strategy 
For the purposes of this dissertation, the researcher used convenience surveys for the 
clients and mail surveys for the managers. Since the purpose of this study was to measure 
preferences, the researcher determined that surveys were the most appropriate medium for 
gathering the necessary data. These types of surveys were chosen for various reasons. First, the 
researcher chose to use a convenience survey because of the nature of the customers being 
surveyed. This population consists of small business owners, who are generally very busy and 
have a tendency to ignore these types of requests or delegate it to some other person within their 
organizations. Therefore, administering surveys at a conference where the attendees were the 
actual business owners was deemed a most rational approach to soliciting their personal 
opinions. This convenience survey was especially desirable because questionnaires administered 
in group settings typically have a high response rate (Trochim, 2002). Additionally, if the 
respondents are unclear about the meaning of a question, they can ask for clarification right on-
the-spot.  
Second, the research was cross-sectional as opposed to longitudinal. Cross-sectional 
surveys are used to gather information on a specific population, at a specific point in time 
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(Babbie, 1973). Cross-sectional surveys can also be also useful in determining the relationship 
between two factors like the experience level of a business owner and his or her preference for 
performance measures. 
Third, this type of research is non-probability sampling. In this type of sampling, 
members are selected from the population in some nonrandom manner (Babbie, 1973). These 
customers were solicited to answer a survey as they enter into the conference area. The 
researcher and her assistant were physically at a table next to the registration table and 
conference attendees were asked and encouraged to complete a survey when they entered the 
conference. Therefore, each attendee had an equal chance of being solicited to complete a 
survey, with the exception of those attendees that left and re-entered conference activities for 
whatever reason. Non-probability sampling includes convenience sampling (such as the type of 
sample used in this dissertation), judgment sampling, quota sampling, and snowball sampling.  
Since the collection of information about personal preferences was the purpose here, the 
use of this type of perception survey was justified and preferred over other methods. By being 
there with the customers, the researcher and her assistant could reasonably ask people who 
initially refused to reconsider answering a survey. According to Fowler (1993), between one-
quarter and one-third of respondents who initially refuse will agree to be [surveyed] when asked 
again at a later time. Therefore, this trend was predicted to increase the response rate. 
Research Procedures  
The sampling frame of this study included small business owners in attendance at the 15th 
Annual OSDBU Procurement Conference, which was held on April 21, 2005, at The Show Place 
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Arena in Upper Marlboro, Maryland . The conference announcement was distributed 
electronically and by regular mail. The e-mail list was compiled from three sources: 
 
1. Business owners that had attended previous conferences 
2. Business owners that had e-mailed the OSDBU office with questions and 
requests for information 
3. Names and addresses of businesses provided by the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) 
Business owners that had previously used the services of the OSDBU were also contacted 
by mail. Therefore, this was a select group of attendees who were all predicted to have a working 
knowledge of the OSDBU, its purpose, and its operations. The expected attendance at the 
conference was between 1,200 and 1,500 and the researcher expected a response rate of 20% or 
approximately 250. Attendees registered up to the last minute, which made it impossible to get 
an accurate list of attendees until the conference actually took place.  
The researcher chose to survey the business owners using a direct, point-of-contact 
approach, as opposed to mailing hard-copy surveys or e-mailing electronic surveys. Using the 
knowledge and experience gained from representing the NASA Educator Resource Center 
(ERC) and Exploration Station (ES) at numerous events, the researcher and her assistant used 
direct, face-to-face contact to encourage conference attendees to participate in this study. The 
researcher chose to conduct this phase of the research using convenience sampling because of the 
nature of the research being conducted. This venue provided the opportunity for the data to be 
both distributed and collected on site. By using this type of direct contact with the respondents 
and this method of gathering data, response time was minimized, since the surveys were 
collected on the spot.  
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Conducting this type of convenience sample also provided the opportunity for the 
researcher to experience this event alongside the business owners, enabling the researcher to 
interact with the business owners, to hear their conversations and concerns, and to observe the 
business owners as they networked with those federal managers in contract decision-making 
positions. This unique opportunity exposed the research team to a wealth of rich, qualitative data 
that the research team would otherwise not have been privy to. 
This conference was a one-day event that was sponsored by the Federal government 
OSDBU, and it focused on networking and educational opportunities. It targeted small 
businesses, federal government agencies, and large businesses, thereby exposing the small 
business owners to both federal agencies with whom they can secure governmental contracts and 
large businesses with whom they can secure governmental sub-contracts. This conference 
basically allowed these entities to connect with each other and assist each other in fulfilling 
specific contracting needs and requirements.  
At the conference, the research team conducted surveys at the first event, which was the 
opening reception that was held on the evening prior to the actual start of the conference. During 
this time period, the research team was stationed next to the registration table. As attendees 
registered, they were given a survey and were encouraged to complete it. As an incentive, some 
type of trinket with a value of less than $1.00 was given to each survey participant when they 
completed and submitted their surveys by placing them in a sealed box with a slot on the top of 
it.  
The second registration period was from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. on Thursday April 21, 
2005. During these registration periods, the research team was located in close proximity to the 
registration table and concentrated their efforts on distributing the surveys. However, the 
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research team was present at all times during scheduled events in order to ensure that things went 
as planned and to encourage attendees to submit their completed surveys. 
Description of the Client Survey Questions 
A copy of the actual survey instrument can be found in Appendix A. This section briefly 
discusses the purpose of these questions.  
Question 1 asked the respondents to identify their position within the company. Question 
2 asked the respondents to classify their business according to the various socioeconomic 
categories established by the Small Business Administration (SBA). These questions are 
demographic questions which give a general description of the respondent and the business itself, 
both of which are characteristics that could possibly influence a respondent’s preferences for 
performance measures.  
Question 3 asked the respondents if they are “Top 100” contractors. This is the elite 
group that falls within the category of the 100 businesses receiving the most contract dollars 
from each federal agency. Being a business that has reached this status, the contractor would 
have had a lot of exposure to the federal contracting arena. This level of experience, coupled 
with the large amounts of revenues involved here would more than likely have an influence on a 
respondent’s preferences for performance measures.  
Question 4 asked the respondents how long their businesses had been in operation. The 
respondent’s level of experience as a business owner could possibly affect their preference for 
performance measures. This question also served as a filter question, in that a business is not 
qualified to bid on federal contracts until they have been in operation for at least two years. 
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Question 5 asked if the business has ever received a federally subsidized loan (i.e., an 
SBA loan). This question gives a general indication of a respondent’s level of reliance on federal 
programs and the respondent’s level of experience in dealing with the bureaucracy involved in 
doing business with the federal government. 
Question 6 asked the respondent to indicate the level of revenues that their business 
earned during the previous year. The amount of revenues gives a general indication of the 
solvency and the size of the business, either of which could possibly have an effect on a 
respondent’s preferences for performance measures. 
Questions 7 and 8 asked if the business had ever received a prime contract with the 
government and, if so, what type of contract. These questions show the amount of experience the 
business owner had in dealing with the federal government and the amount of entrepreneurial 
experience the business owner had. Primarily prime contractors have been in business longer and 
are larger businesses than those who are not. Also, the type of contract won will indicate the type 
of services generally offered by the businesses. More specifically, the researcher has categorized 
these as supplies and equipment, research and development, technical services, and other. The 
category indicated here could possibly influence a respondent’s preference for performance 
measures. For example, a contractor that wins a contract in research and development or 
technical services could possibly have different preferences for performance measurement than 
other, more general contractors that provide supplies or maintenance. 
Question 9 also referred to the type of prime contract won in Question 7. This question 
asked if the contract was won competitively or through a set-aside program. The answer to this 
question would indicate the respondent’s reliance on government programs. The answer would 
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also indicate the socioeconomic status and the size of the business, in that there are certain 
parameters that must be met in order to qualify for a set-aside. 
Question 10 asked if the business had ever been awarded a sub-contract with a federal 
agency. Similar to Question 7, this question would suggest the amount of experience one has in 
dealing with the federal government. These businesses should tend to be smaller and less 
experienced than those found in Question 7. 
Question 11 asked if the business owner had received training through an OSDBU 
program. This would indicate the respondent’s familiarity with and general knowledge of the 
OSDBU and the services that it has to offer. 
Question 12 asked if the business had ever been part of a teaming agreement and 
Question 13 asked if the business had ever participated in the Mentor-Protégé Program. 
Combined, these questions indicated the business owners’ willingness to take full advantage of 
the types of services and programs offered through the OSDBU. Business owners who have 
participated in both of these programs are people who have taken full advantage of the 
opportunities available to expose themselves to the appropriate individuals for winning contracts. 
Question 14 asked if the business was ISO certified. It is generally a requirement that a 
business be ISO certified in order to become involved in the contracting arena. 
Question 15 asked what the customer feels that the primary mission of the OSDBU is. 
This question was designed to determine if the customer has an accurate and realistic 
understanding of what the true goals of the OSDBU are and how they go about accomplishing 
those goals. 
Question 16 was the most crucial question in this survey. The purpose of this question 
was to determine the customer’s actual preferences for performance measures. The questions 
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were categorized based on the five perspectives of the MBSC model and were grouped 
accordingly, though this categorization was not revealed to the respondent.  
Questions 17 through 19 were general demographic questions. However, the 
characteristics being questioned here were all features about a respondent that could have an 
impact on preferences for measuring performance. These qualities were age, gender, and 
educational level attained. As people tend to mature, their views on life tend to change as well. 
Their spirit of idealism yields to the fortitude of realism, thus causing their preferences for 
measuring performance to change. Gender is also a quality that could possibly have an impact on 
the respondent’s performance measurement preferences, since women and men often view things 
differently. There might also be differences in preferences based on whether the respondent is a 
high school graduate versus a four-year college graduate. 
Description of the Federal Manager Surveys 
A copy of the instrument is presented in Appendix B. Many questions in this survey are 
the same in the client survey described above, although there are questions specifically designed 
for this respondent group. Question 1 asked the respondents to identify their positions within 
their respective federal agencies or departments. Question 2 asked the respondents how long they 
had worked in their current positions. Question 3 asked the respondents how long they had 
worked for their respective federal agencies or departments. Questions 4 and 5 asked the 
respondents if they had worked for any other federal agencies or departments and, if so, how 
long. Question 6 asked the respondents to indicate their total number of years of federal 
governmental experience.  
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Collectively these first six questions are an indication of how much exposure each 
manager had to the federal government as a total system. The number of different federal 
positions an individual has held, the number of years of federal experience, and the highest rank 
attained should have an impact on that individual’s preferences for performance measures.  
Question 7 asked for the total dollar amount of the contracts awarded to small businesses 
by that individual’s respective agency or department during the past fiscal year. As more dollars 
are spent with small businesses, the individuals involved should likely become more familiar 
with small businesses, thereby possibly having an effect on their preferences for performance 
measures.  
Question 8 asked, in the manager’s perception, what the customers of the OSDBU feel is 
the primary mission of the OSDBU. This question was designed to reveal a respondent’s opinion 
about what the customers want from them. By asking what the managers feel the customers 
want, the researcher was really trying to determine what the managers feel about their customers. 
Question 9 was the most crucial question in this survey. The purpose of this question was 
to determine the manager’s actual preferences for performance measures. The questions were 
categorized based on the five perspectives of the MBSC model and were grouped accordingly, 
though this categorization was not revealed to the respondent.  
Questions 10 through 12 are general demographic questions. These questions were 
designed to elicit various characteristics about the respondent that could possibly have an impact 
on how he or she viewed certain situations, thereby impacting the respondent’s preferences for 
measuring performance. The characteristics being assessed in this study were age, gender, and 
educational level attained. Most of the managers questioned here tended to be older than 40. 
These were people that had typically worked their way up through the ranks of federal service 
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and would therefore have been in the workforce for many years. Simply by virtue of their tenure 
with the government, these individuals tended to be older workers, which might have had an 
impact on their preferences for measuring performance. 
Gender is also a variable that might possibly have had an impact on these managers’ 
preferences for performance measurement, and might have been reflected in this survey. From 
the federal OSDBU list, the titles that are listed are Director, Associate Administrator, Deputy 
Director, Women Business Rep, Veteran Business Rep, and Supplier Diversity Program 
Manager. Each federal agency or department has at least one of the above listed managers, with 
most having two to three. Based on their job titles, some differences in preferences could 
possibly have existed. 
There could possibly also have been differences in preferences based on the manager’s 
level of educational attainment. Most of the respondents will have at least a four-year college 
degree, with many having at least some graduate-level education. Differences in preferences for 
performance measures could be reflected here based on these various educational levels. 
Question 13 asked if the respondent had ever owned his or her own business. Though this 
was not expected to be a large number, if the manager had owned a business before, he or she 
might have been expected to have a different perception of what businesses owners’ needs are 
and thereby might have had different expectations about the services that should be offered by 
the OSDBU. This would likely have had an impact on their preferences for performance 
measurement.  
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Instrumentation and Measurement  
For the purposes of this study, the researcher was attempting to determine what the 
performance measurement preferences are for two separate and distinct groups. The first group 
was that of federal managers. The second group was the clients that they serve. Once the 
performance measurement preferences for these groups were identified, the researcher evaluated 
various characteristics of each sample to see if any of these characteristics were truly indicators 
or predictors of preferences.  
In designing the client survey instrument, the researcher categorized the survey questions 
so that the responses could be grouped into the five levels of the dependent variable. However, 
the researcher has chosen to mix the order of the questions so that the visual order of the 
questions won’t be thought of as a unit by the respondents (Dillman, 2000). By mixing the 
questions, the researcher was encouraging the respondents to think of each question separately. 
The questions are ordered in the following manner: 
Questions 1–4 represent the clients’ preferences for client measures 
Questions 5–8 represent the clients’ preferences for financial measures 
Questions 9–12 represent the clients’ preferences for learning and growth measures 
Questions 13–16 represent the clients’ preferences for internal management process 
measures 
Questions 17–19 represent the clients’ preferences for public good measures.  
In designing the manager survey instrument, the researcher also categorized the survey 
questions so that the responses could be grouped in the five levels of the dependent variable. 
Once again, the researcher chose to mix the order of the questions for the same reasons as listed 
above. The questions were ordered in the following manner: 
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Questions 1–4 represent the managers’ preferences for client measures 
Questions 5–8 represent the managers’ preferences for financial measures 
Questions 9–12 represent the managers’ preferences for learning and growth measures 
Questions 13–16 represent the managers’ preferences for internal management process 
measures 
Questions 17–19 represent the managers’ preferences for public good measures. 
Though the questions on the survey instrument were mixed, the researcher took measures 
to ensure that the questions could be re-categorized into groups based on preferences, thereby 
maintaining the integrity of the original ordering of the questions.  
Dependent Variables and Independent Variables 
The primary dependent variable was constructed to represent aspects of the respondents’ 
preferences for performance measures. The model represented five levels of the dependent 
variable derived from the MBSC model. The five levels of the dependent variable were 
preference for financial measures, preference for client measures, preference for internal 
management process measures, preference for learning and growth measures, and preference for 
public good measures. The independent variable measures for the client surveys are represented 
in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
Independent Variable Measures for the Client Survey 
[Variable] / Operational definition Type 
[Position] within the company Nominal 
[Socio] economic categorization of their respective businesses Interval 
[Top] 100 contractor Nominal 
[Exp] number of years in business Continuous 
[Loan] recipient of federally subsidized loan Nominal 
[Revs] level of annual revenues Ordinal 
[Prime] ever received prime contract Nominal 
[Type] of contract received Interval 
[Comp] was contract bid competitively Nominal 
[Sub] ever received sub-contract Nominal 
[Train] ever participated in OSDBU training Nominal 
[Team] ever participated in teaming agreement Nominal 
[ISO] certification Nominal 
[Mission] of the OSDBU Interval 
[Age] demo Ordinal 
[Gender] demo Nominal 
[Educ] highest level attained Ordinal 
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The independent variable measures for the Manager surveys are represented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Independent Variable Measures for the Manager Surveys 
Variable / Operational definition Type 
[Position] within their respective governmental agencies Interval 
[Exp] length of time in that position Nominal 
[Expagency] worked for other governmental agency Nominal 
[Expother] length of time with other agency(ies) Ordinal 
[Fedexp] total federal experience Ordinal 
[Contdoll] annual contract dollars awarded to small businesses Ordinal 
[Mission] of the OSDBU Interval 
[Age] demo Ordinal 
[Gender] demo Nominal 
[Educ] demo Ordinal 
 
Measuring Client and Manager Preferences in the MBSC 
On the client surveys, Question 16 was primarily designed to reveal what measures the 
customers feel are important. The answers compiled from this section collectively represented 
the customer preferences for performance measures. A modified five-point Likert scale was used 
for this series of responses, with the responses beings as follows: 
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Very important = 4 
Important = 3 
Somewhat important = 2 
Not important = 1 
Don’t know or can’t say = 0 
The “don’t know or can’t say” responses were not included in the calculations. 
On the manager surveys Question 9 was primarily designed to reveal what measures the 
managers perceived to be as important. On the client survey, Question 15 primarily solicited the 
same information. The answers compiled from these questions collectively represented the 
manager preferences and client preferences for performance measures, respectively. With the 
exception of the questions mentioned above, the remainder of the questions on both surveys were 
designed to establish what determines the client and manager preferences for performance 
measures, thereby identifying specific indicators of performance preferences. The researcher was 
evaluating a mix of demographic and other characteristics of the clients and managers in order to 
determine if they have effects on the respective performance measurement preferences. 
Additionally, there was a question on each respective survey that asked what the respondent 
understood the mission of the OSDBU as being.  
The general statements of hypotheses for this research were as follows: 
H1: Clients have different preferences toward different performance measures specified 
in the MBSC model. 
H2: Managers have different preferences toward different performance measures 
specified in the MBSC model. 
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H3: Organizational and demographic variables specified in this study are associated with 
clients’ preferences for performance measures.  
H4: Organizational and demographic variables specified in this study are associated with 
managers’ preferences for performance measures  
The researcher used the data collected in this study to determine if these hypotheses 
should be accepted or rejected. Additionally, the researcher used the data to determine the order 
of the preferences of the respondents and generalized the results to the general population of 
small business owners and federal managers. 
Summary 
In this chapter, the researcher explained the methodology for determining the 
performance measurement preferences of federal managers and the clients that they serve, 
including their opinions regarding the purpose of the OSDBU. Both a sample of federal 
managers and a sample of their clients were surveyed to determine what their performance 
measurement preferences were and if there were any indicators that might predict what those 
preferences might be based on specific characteristics. In other words, the researcher wanted to 
determine which variables possibly have an effect on the preferences of the respondents for 
performance measures.  
Chapter V presents the results from the client survey. Chapter VI presents the results 
from the manager survey. The survey questions used to solicit the preferences of both sets of 
respondents were identical, with the exception of the questions used to measure the control 
variables or demographic characteristics. This enabled the researcher to make a comparison of 
the respective preferences and draw conclusions. 
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CHAPTER V 
CLIENT SURVEY RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the statistical results of the client survey. This analysis was 
primarily conducted in two parts, and these two parts were designed to answer the second and 
third research questions, which are “what are the stakeholders’ preferences for performance 
measures?” and “what determines the preferences?” The underlying premise is that it is critical 
to identify such preferences to guide the design and development of an appropriate measurement 
system so that the measures in the system are more likely to be accepted by stakeholder groups. 
In this study, preferences of clients and managers are examined. The managers are responsible 
for the design of a measurement system and the clients are the recipient of the services or 
products that are measured by the system. This chapter focuses on the preferences of clients on 
the measures.  
Univariate Analysis 
Univariate Analysis of the Dependent Variables 
Table 4 presents the survey items that were used to measure the dependent variables that 
represent the client preferences for the performance measures. Actual survey items and their 
corresponding measurement perspectives are included in the table.  
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Table 4 
Survey Items to Measure the Dependent Variables—Preference for Performance Measures 
Item Perspective Actual survey item 
A client the number of clients that participate in the Mentor–Protégé Program  
B financial dollar amount spent by the OSDBU per client 
C employee the number of employees that attend job related training workshops 
D employee percentage of employees rated above “satisfactory” on their performance appraisals 
E financial dollar amount spent per contract by the OSDBU 
F client the number of clients that participate in teaming agreements 
G processes the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a contract 
H public good the percentage of citizens who are happy with the performance of the OSDBU 
I client the number of clients that participate in OSDBU programs 
J financial the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients annually 
K employee the number of OSDBU employees that have a bachelors degree or higher 
L client the percentage of clients that are happy or very satisfied with the level of service 
provided by the OSDBU 
M processes the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU  
N processes the number of OSDBU employees per contract awarded to OSDBU clients 
O processes the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be become certified 
P financial the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients 
Q employee the number of employees that attend job-related conferences annually 
R public good the percentage of elected officials who are satisfied with the performance of the 
OSDBU 
S public good the percentage of it SBA mandated goals achieved 
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The questions on the client-survey instrument were categorized so that the responses 
were grouped into the five designed measurement perspectives: financial perspectives, client 
perspectives, employee perspectives, internal management process perspectives, and public 
goods perspectives. By mixing the order of the questions, the researcher altered the visual 
arrangement so that the questions would not be thought of as a unit by the respondents (Dillman, 
2000), thereby encouraging the respondents to think of each question separately and 
independently.  
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics of the respondents’ preferences for performance 
measures. Percentages of “very important,” “important,” “somewhat important,” and “not 
important” of each individual item measuring preferences toward performance measures are 
presented in the table. The means and standard deviations of these survey items are also 
presented. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive Analysis of Respondents’ Preferences for Performance Measures 
Variable % Very 
important 
% Important % Somewhat 
important 
%  
Not 
important 
Mean Std dev 
Client       
Item A 10.0 12.9 52.0 19.6 2.02 .973 
Item F 3.3 13.0 70.3 6.9 2.00 .770 
Item I 8.6 23.7 52.9 9.0 2.21 .929 
Item L 22.9 57.3 8.6 7.2 2.92 1.04 
Average 11.2 26.73 45.95 10.68 2.29 .930 
       
Financial       
Item B 19.7 30.3 31.0 13.1 2.45 1.12 
Item E 12.7 35.5 42.0 6.5 2.51 .98 
Item J 42.9 37.8 9.7 6.1 3.20 1.20 
Item P 36.9 44.4 10.0 5.7 3.07 .98 
Average 28.05 37.0 23.18 7.85 2.81 1.07 
       
Employee       
Item C 3.3 6.9 44.9 31.9 1.55 .919 
Item D 9.8 14.1 56.9 12.7 2.08 .958 
Item K 6.1 8.6 12.2 45.7 1.21 1.12 
Item Q 2.9 7.2 42.3 39.4 1.57 .85 
Average 5.53 9.20 39.08 32.43 1.60 .96 
       
Processes       
Item G 45.3 35.3 12.2 7.2 3.24 .985 
Item M 2.9 14.7 64.5 15.1 2.00 .727 
Item N 7.5 14.0 50.9 16.1 1.90 1.03 
Item O 37.3 40.5 6.5 15.8 2.99 1.04 
Average 23.25 26.13 33.53 13.6 2.53 .95 
       
Public Good       
Item H 7.6 19.8 39.6 24.5 1.93 1.04 
Item R 17.2 35.1 23.3 24.4 2.45 1.04 
Item S 43.0 35.5 13.6 1.8 3.07 1.09 
Average 22.6 30.13 25.5 16.9 2.48 1.06 
Note:  These items are labeled in Table 4 
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Table 5 shows several interesting findings. First, on average, survey respondents scored 
2.81 on the items measuring preferences for financial measures (with 4 = very important, 
3 = important, 2 = somewhat important, and 1 = not important), the highest average score of all 
measures of the five measurement perspectives. This result indicates that, on average, clients 
prefer financial measures more than any other type of measures. The result suggests that, 
although OSDBU is a governmental agency with goals of serving public interests, both financial 
performance and financial condition are of interest to the clients. This illustrates the importance 
of effectively and efficiently managing the financial resources of governmental agencies. 
Another interesting finding in Table 5 is that there are no apparent differences between 
preference for internal management process measures (mean = 2.53), preference for public good 
measures (mean = 2.48), and preference for client measures (mean = 2.29). Clearly, respondents 
on average think these measures are “somewhat important”(2) or “important”(3) in assessing the 
performance of OSDBU. 
The findings in Table 5 also show that preference for employee measures is the least 
preferred category of client preferences (mean = 1.60). It is possible that business clients believe 
that employee management is an internal organizational function, as opposed to being a concern 
of the clients. It is also possible that respondents may perceive that it is the responsibility of the 
management of the agency, not its clients, to assess and monitor employee performance. 
 
Client Perspective Analysis 
Preference for financial measures received the highest overall scores, with a mean score 
of 2.81. Preference for financial measures also had the tightest overall fit, with a range of 0.75. 
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The highest score within this perspective was 3.20 and the lowest score within this perspective 
was 2.45. 
Preference for employee measures received the lowest overall scores, with a mean score 
of 1.60. The range of scores exhibited in this perspective was relatively small, with the range 
being 0.88. The highest single score in this perspective was 2.08, and this was the only score 
over 2.0. The other scores in this category ranged from 1.21 to 1.60.  
The perspective with the most disparity was internal management processes, with a range 
of 1.34. Internal management processes also had the highest single score of 3.24. The response 
associated with this score was “the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a 
contract”—an outcome measure.  
The second highest single score was 3.20. This score was associated with the response 
“the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients annually.” This response is 
also an outcome measure. Tied for third were “the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU 
clients” and “the percentage of SBA mandated goals achieved,” both with mean scores of 3.07 
and both outcome measures. 
In considering the relationships among and between the various preferences, it is 
interesting to look into the relationship among these five measurement perspectives to gain 
information on how they impact each other. Table 6 shows correlation coefficients between the 
five measurement perspectives: 
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Table 6 
Client Correlation Matrix of Index Dependent Variables 
 Financial Client Internal Employee Public good 
Financial 1.0     
Client .620 1.0    
Internal .362 .456 1.0   
Employee .505 .573 .399 1.0  
Public good .435 .379 .194 .599 1.0 
 
 
Several findings of the correlation analysis of the dependent variable are important. First, 
there is a strong relationship between preferences for client measures and preferences for 
financial measures. The correlation coefficient for this combination is .620. This indicates that 
respondents who prefer client measures also prefer financial measures.  
Another relatively strong correlation is between public good measures and employee 
measures (r = .599). Respondents who prefer public good measures tend to prefer the measures 
of employee performance. This relationship suggests that respondents tend to believe that 
employee performance constitutes of a significant part of what is perceived to be the public 
good. Collectively, the employees are those people who actually serve the public and are thus 
those who operationalize and implement public programs. They are the ones that are face-to-face 
with those clients that receive the public services and goods.  
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A third potentially significant relationship is that between preference for financial 
measures and preference for employee measures (r = .505). Both types of measures, in addition 
to the internal management process measures, represent functional areas that primarily fall under 
the responsibility of the agency managers. Of the five perspectives, these three perspectives are 
basically internal to the public organizations. The public managers or administrators and the 
employees operate within the public organization, and they use internal management processes 
to administer public processes. The other two perspectives represent perspectives found outside 
of the public organization, with those being the public good and the clients.  
Univariate Analysis of the Independent Variables 
Table 7 presents survey items measuring independent variables. Actual survey items and 
their abbreviated variables names used in analysis of this study are presented in the table. 
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Table 7 
Survey Items to Measure the Independent Variables 
Item # Item description Variable name 
1 current position Posc 
2 business classification Classc 
3 top 100 contractor Topc 
4 years business has been in operation Expc 
5 rec’d federally subsidized loan Loanc 
6 annual gross revenues Revsc 
7 ever awarded a prime federal contract Primec 
8 type of contract awarded in #7 Contypec 
9 contract in #7 competitive or set-aside Compc 
10 ever awarded a subcontract Subc 
11 ever rec’d training through OSDBU Trainc 
12 ever participated in a teaming agreement Teamc 
13 ever participated in mentor-protégé program Mentc 
14 ISO certified* ISOc 
16 understanding of the OSDBU’s mission Missionc 
17 respondent’s age Agec 
18 respondent’s gender Genderc 
19 respondent’s level of educational attainment Educc 
*International Organization for Standardization 
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There are 19 independent variables in this analysis. This chapter presents the univariate 
analysis of selected variables that may interest the reader the most. The variables selected for 
detailed analysis are annual revenues for the respondent’s business, respondent’s level of 
entrepreneurial experience, whether the respondent has ever been awarded a prime contract, 
whether or not the respondent is ISO certified, and whether or not the respondent has ever been 
awarded a subcontract. These variables represent the mean responses that were rated most highly 
by the clients. 
Table 8 describes the frequency distributions of annual revenues of respondents’ 
businesses. It is interesting to note that 58.4% of the respondents have revenues of $750,001 or 
more annually or 45% of the respondents have annual revenues that exceed $1,000,000. 
  
Table 8 
Annual Revenues of Respondents’ Businesses (N = 260) 
Annual revenue Number of cases Percentage of total 
Less than $100,000 27 10.4 
$100,001 to $250,000 36 13.8 
$250,001 to $500,000 36 13.8 
$500,001 to $750,000 9 3.5 
$750,001 to $1,000,000 36 13.8 
More than $1,000,000 116 44.6 
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Table 9 shows frequency distribution of respondents’ level of entrepreneurial experience. 
It is also interesting to note that almost 45% of these respondents have been in business for over 
10 years. 
 
Table 9 
Respondents’ Level of Entrepreneurial Experience (N = 279) 
Years of experience Number of cases Percentage of total 
Less than 1 year 18 6.5 
1–2 years 9 3.2 
3–4 years 27 9.7 
5–6 years 73 26.2 
7–8 years 18 6.5 
9–10 years 9 3.2 
More than 10 years 125 44.8 
 
 
Findings in Table 10 show that about 58% of respondents have prime contracting 
experience that directly deals with the federal government, as opposed to being subcontractors or 
non-contractors.  
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Table 10 
Prime Contracting Experience (N = 278) 
Response Number of cases Percentage of total 
Yes 161 57.9 
No 108 38.8 
Not sure 9 3.2 
 
 
Table 11 shows that about 58% of respondents do not have ISO certification. It is even 
more interesting that almost 20% of these respondents were not sure if they were ISO certified. 
 
Table 11 
ISO Certification (N = 278) 
Response Number of cases Percentage of total 
Yes 54 19.4 
No 161 57.9 
Not sure 54 19.4 
Missing 9 3.2 
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Table 12 shows the respondents’ subcontracting experience with the federal government. 
Nearly 55% of these respondents claim to have subcontracting experience, while nearly 58% 
claim to have prime contracting experience. 
 
Table 12 
Subcontracting Experience (N = 278) 
Response Number of cases Percentage of total 
Yes 152 54.7 
No 108 38.8 
Not sure 18 6.5 
 
The results of the above analysis on the selected variables indicate that the respondents 
come from relatively large revenue companies with strong experiences in management, and the 
majority of them have worked with the federal government as a prime contractors or 
subcontractor. These findings suggest that this group of respondents may have sufficient 
managerial and contracting background to answer the survey questions measuring perception for 
performance measures in the federal government. 
Bivariate Analysis 
In this section, the independent variables were examined for their relationships with the 
dependent variables. This analysis is a critical step in the analysis process because these 
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relationships provide the foundation on which the true relationships between the independent 
variables and the dependent variables are built.  
Preference for Financial Measures 
Table 13 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for financial 
measures and the independent variables. The results show that respondents in organizations that 
have larger revenues tend to prefer financial measures more (Tau-c = .200).  
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Table 13 
Preference for Financial Measures 
 Measure of association Test of 
significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p Χ2 
Revenues .200  .000 551.7 (p = .000)
Experience .323  .000 345.0 (p = .000)
Age -.024   .596 157.8 (p = .000)
Education .027   .579 254.2 (p = .000)
Position -.208  .000 299.7 (p = .000)
Prime  .225 .000 121.1 (p = .000)
ISO  .079 .012 320.0 (p = .000)
Subcontract  .144 .000 102.8 (p = .000)
Top 100  .037 .280 73.9 (p = .000)
Loan  .198 .000 155.3 (p = .000)
Contract type  .174 .000 160.2 (p = .000)
Competitive  .206 .000 221.1 (p = .000)
Train  .163 .000 200.0 (p = .000)
Team  .064 .000 58.3 (p = .000)
Mentor  .079 .000 137.5 (p = .000)
ISO  .080 .009 321.4 (p = .000)
Mission  .217 .000 442.3 (p = .000)
Sex  .091 .005 79.8 (p = .000)
 
The results show that there is a negative relationship between position and preference for 
financial measures in these organizations. More specifically, the higher the respondents’ position 
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within the organization, the less the respondents tend to prefer financial measures. This 
relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = -.132, p = .000).  
The results also show that there is a positive relationship between revenues earned in the 
organizations and respondents’ preference for financial measures in these organizations. Based 
on this finding, the more revenues earned by an organization annually, the higher the level of 
preference of the respondent in that organization for financial measures. Logically, this 
relationship makes sense in that people from organizations that earn more would have a stronger 
preference for financial measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level 
(Tau-c = .200, p = .000).  
An additional positive relationship was shown to exist between organizational experience 
and respondents’ preference for financial measures in these organizations. These findings 
basically show that the longer an organization has been in existence the higher the level of 
preference of the respondent in that organization for financial measures. The logic behind that is 
that older organizations tend to have higher levels of revenues than younger ones, especially 
when one considers that fact that longevity tends to weed out less successful organizations within 
the first two years. This relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level (Tau-c = .091, 
p = .041).  
Another relationship of interest is that between level of education attained by the 
respondent and preference for financial measures. This relationship is positive and tends to show 
that the more education the respondent has the less he or she tends to prefer financial measures, 
with the implication being that those individuals with more education have more of an 
appreciation of a balanced set of measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 
level (Tau-c = -.121, p = .006).   
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An additional relationship that was shown to exist is that between organizations that have 
previously been awarded at least one prime contract and preference for financial measures in 
these organizations (Lambda = .225, p = .000). The average preference for financial measures 
exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one contract is 3.05, while 
the average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have never been 
awarded a prime contract is 2.49 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors 
that have previously been awarded at least one prime contract prefer financial measures more 
than contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract. This finding is consistent with 
the fact that prime contractors tend to be larger organizations.  
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Table 14 
Average Preferences of Respondents Answering “Yes” and Answering “No” on Yes–No Questions 
 Financial Client Public good Processes Employee 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Prime 3.05 2.49 2.42 2.11 2.61 2.31 2.47 2.62 1.82 1.30 
ISO 3.05 2.76 2.14 2.33 2.20 2.55 2.49 2.54 1.26 1.68 
Sub 3.00 2.57 2.46 2.09 2.60 2.35 2.56 2.50 1.88 1.26 
Top 3.00 2.87 2.50 2.29 2.83 2.48 2.50 2.53 1.25 1.60 
Loan 2.57 3.05 1.98 2.25 2.25 2.64 2.64 2.29 1.41 1.84 
Competitive 3.01 2.94 2.52 2.27 2.52 2.61 2.73 2.24 1.71 1.79 
Train 2.65 2.95 2.36 2.31 2.27 2.61 2.71 2.48 1.71 1.76 
Team 2.99 2.45 2.33 2.21 2.54 2.36 2.54 2.51 1.73 1.34 
Mentor 3.06 2.74 2.41 2.26 2.15 2.55 2.64 2.50 1.49 1.62 
ISO 3.05 2.76 2.14 2.33 2.20 2.55 2.49 2.54 1.26 1.68 
Sex 2.63 2.60 2.11 2.39 2.37 2.54 2.43 2.53 1.43 1.44 
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The results also show that respondents from ISO certified organizations tend to prefer 
financial measures (Lambda = .079; p=.012). The average preference for financial measures 
exhibited by contractors that are ISO certified is 3.05, while the average preference for financial 
measures exhibited by contractors that are not ISO certified is 2.76 (Table 14). This finding 
indicates that, on average, contractors that are ISO certified prefer financial measures more than 
contractors that are not ISO certified. 
 Another result shows that there is a relationship between organizations that have 
previously been awarded at least one federal government subcontract and preference for financial 
measures in these organizations (Lambda = .144; p = .000). This finding is consistent with the 
previous finding regarding prime contractors. The average preference for financial measures 
exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one federal government 
subcontract is 3.00, while the average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors 
who have never been awarded a federal government subcontract is 2.57 (Table 14). This finding 
indicates that, on average, contractors who have previously been awarded at least one federal 
government subcontract prefer financial measures more than contractors who have never been 
awarded a federal government subcontract.  
A relationship between organizations that have never received a federally subsidized loan 
and preference for financial measures in these organizations was also shown to exist 
(Lambda = .198; p = .000). The average preference for financial measures exhibited by 
contractors that have never received a federally subsidized loan is 3.05 (Table 14), while the 
average preference for organizations that have received at least one federally subsidized loan is 
2.57. This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have never received a federally 
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subsidized loan prefer financial measures more than contractors that have previously received at 
least one federally subsidized loan. 
The results from this study also show that there is a relationship between OSDBU 
training and preference for financial measures in these organizations (Lambda = .163; p = .000). 
The average preference for financial measures in organizations that have never received training 
through the OSDBU office is 2.95 (Table 14), while the average preference for financial 
measures by contractors that have received training through the OSDBU office is 2.65. This 
finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have not received training through the 
OSDBU office prefer financial measures more than contractors that have received training 
through the OSDBU office.  
 Another result shows that there is a relationship between teaming agreements and 
preference for financial measures in these organizations (Lambda = .064; p = .000). The average 
preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have previously participated in 
teaming agreements is 2.99, while the average preference for financial measures exhibited by 
contractors that have never participated in a teaming agreement is 2.45 (Table 14). This finding 
indicates that, on average, contractors that have previously participated in a teaming agreement 
prefer financial measures more than contractors that have never participated in a teaming 
agreement.  
Finally, the results show that there is a relationship between mentorship and preference 
for financial measures in these organizations (Lambda = .079; p = .000). The average preference 
for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have participated in the mentorship program 
is 3.06, while the average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that never 
participated in the mentorship program is 2.74 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on 
 97
average, contractors that have had mentors prefer financial measures more than contractors that 
have not had mentors.  
Preference for Client Measures 
Table 15 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for client 
measures and the independent variables.  
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Table 15 
Preference for Client Measures 
 Measure of association Test of 
significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p Χ2 
Revenues .305  .000 346.5 (p = .000)
Experience .091  .041 356.6 (p = .000)
Age -.032  .386 174.9 (p = .000)
Education -.121  .006 258.6 (p = .000)
Position -.132  .008 218.5 (p = .000)
Prime  .099 .011 79.8 (p = .000)
ISO  .079 .012 320.0 (p = .000)
Subcontract  .099 .015 176.2 (p = .000)
Top 100  .032 .010 70.0 (p = .000)
Loan  .182 .000 350.4 (p = .000)
Contract type  .149 .000 202.2 (p = .000)
Competitive  .128 .000 128.3 (p = .000)
Train  .145 .000 208.3 (p = .000)
Team  .069 .001 84. 5 (p = .000)
Mentor  .078 .000 224.7 (p = .000)
ISO  .069 .006 360.3 (p = .000)
Mission  .198 .000 429.3 (p = .000)
Sex  .108 .000 78.9 (p = .000)
 
 
The most noteworthy level of association is that between revenues and preference for 
client measures. This result shows that there is a positive relationship between revenues and 
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preference for client measures in these organizations. More specifically, the more revenues 
earned by an organization annually, the higher the level of preference of the respondent in that 
organization for client measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level 
(Tau-c = .305, p = .000).  
There also appears to be a positive relationship between experience and preference for 
client measures, though the relationship is weak but significant at the .05 level (Tau-c = .091, 
p = .041). As a result, the longer the client has been in business, the more he or she would tend to 
prefer client measures.  
The relationships between position and education with preference for client measures are 
negative and relatively weak (Tau-c = -.132, p = .000; Tau-c = -.121, p = .006). Therefore, the 
higher the rank of the business owner (i.e. CEO, President, Partner, CFO, VP, etc.) and the more 
education the respondent, the less he or she tends to prefer client measures.  
Other relationships were also examined and found to have some level of significance. 
According to the results obtained here, there is a relationship between organizations that have 
previously been awarded at least one prime contract and preference for client measures, though 
the level of association is weak (Lambda = .099; p = .011). The average preference for client 
measures exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one contract is 
2.42, while the average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that have never 
been awarded a prime contract is 2.11 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, 
contractors that have previously been awarded at least one prime contract prefer client measures 
slightly more than contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract.  
These results show that there is a slight relationship between not being ISO certified and 
preference for client measures (Lambda = .079; p = .012). The average preference for client 
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measures exhibited by contractors that are not ISO certified is 2.33 (Table 14), while the average 
preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that are ISO certified is 2.14. This finding 
indicates that, on average, contractors that are not ISO certified tend to prefer client measures 
more than organizations that are ISO certified, but just slightly more. 
 These results also show that there is a relationship between subcontracting and 
preference for client measures (Lambda = .099, p = .015). The average preference for client 
measures exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one federal 
government subcontract is 2.46, while the average preference for client measures exhibited by 
contractors that have never been awarded a federal government subcontract is 2.09 (Table 14). 
This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have previously been awarded at least 
one federal government subcontract tend to prefer financial measures more than contractors that 
have never been awarded a federal government subcontract.  
The results show that there is a relationship between Top 100 contractors and preference 
for client measures (Lambda = .032, p = .010), though the relationship is almost infinitesimal. 
Regardless, the average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that are 
considered to be Top 100 contractors is 2.50, and the average preference for client measures 
exhibited by contractors that are not Top 100 contractors is 2.29 (Table 14). 
The results also show that there is a relationship between organizations that have never 
received a federally subsidized loan and preference for client measures (Lambda = .182; 
p = .000). The average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that have never 
received a federally subsidized loan is 2.25 (Table 14), while the average preference for 
organizations that have received at least one federally subsidized loan is 1.98. This finding 
indicates that, on average, contractors that have never received a federally subsidized loan prefer 
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client measures more than contractors that have previously received at least one federally 
subsidized loan. 
Additionally, the results show that there is a slight relationship between OSDBU training 
and preference for client measures (Lambda = .145, p = .000). The average preferences for client 
measures in organizations that have received OSDBU training and organizations that have never 
received training through the OSDBU office are almost equal at 2.36 and 2.31, respectively 
(Table 14). This finding indicates that there is literally no difference in the preference for client 
measures between contractors that have participated in the various opportunities for training 
offered by the OSDBU and those contractors that have not.  
Another result shows that there is a slight relationship between teaming agreements and 
preference for client measures (Lambda = .069; p = .001). The average preference for client 
measures exhibited by contractors that have previously participated in teaming agreements is 
2.33, while the average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that have never 
participated in a teaming agreement is 2.21 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, 
contractors that have previously participated in a teaming agreement very slightly prefer client 
measures more than contractors that have never participated in a teaming agreement.  
A slight relationship was shown to exist between mentorship and preference for client 
measures in these organizations (Lambda = .078; p = .000). The average preference for client 
measures exhibited by contractors that have participated in the mentorship program is 2.41, 
while the average preference for client measures exhibited by contractors that never participated 
in the mentorship program is 2.26 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors 
that have had mentors prefer client measures just slightly more than contractors that have not had 
mentors.  
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Finally, these results show that there is a slight relationship between sex and preference 
for client measures (Lambda = .108; p = .000). The average preference for client measures 
exhibited by male respondents is 2.11, while the average preference for client measures by 
female respondents is 2.39 (Table 14). This finding indicates that male and female respondents 
are almost equal in their preference for client measures.  
Preference for Public Good Measures 
Table 16 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for public 
good measures and the independent variables.  
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Table 16 
Preference for Public Good Measures 
 Measure of association Test of significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p Χ2 
Revenues .231  .000 281.8 (p = .000) 
Experience .141  .001 398.5 (p = .000) 
Age -.080  .074 192.2 (p = .000) 
Education -.203  .000 276.4 (p = .000) 
Position -.180  .000 370.9 (p = .000) 
Prime  .118 .004 70.8 (p = .000) 
ISO  .079 .012 320.0 (p = .000) 
Subcontract  .124 .004 86.4 (p = .000) 
Top 100  .056 .193 52.4 (p = .000) 
Loan  .153 .000 129.5 (p = .000) 
Contract type  .149 .000 116.8 (p = .000) 
Competitive  .279 .000 115.7 (p = .000) 
Train  .120 .002 142.8 (p = .000) 
Team  .067 .037 49.2 (p = .000) 
Mentor  .048 .188 116.2 (p = .000) 
ISO  .133 .001 341.3 (p = .000) 
Mission  .301 .000 463.9 (p = .000) 
Sex  .085 .071 75.0 (p = .000) 
 
The most noteworthy relationship with preferences for public good measures is that of 
those organizations that have won bids for contracts that were won competitively 
(Lambda = .279, p = .000). The results show that the average preference for public good 
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measures exhibited by those respondents that have won competitive bids for federal contracts is 
2.52, while the average preference for public good measures exhibited by those respondents that 
have not won any competitive bids for contracts is 2.61 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, 
on average, contractors that have competitively secured at least one federal contract prefer public 
good measures more than contractors that have not been able to competitively secure a federal 
government contract. In addition to those recipients that have never secured any type of federal 
contract, the latter category includes those respondents who have secured federal contract dollars 
through set-asides and through other means such as grants.  
There also appears to be a relationship between revenues and preference for public good 
measures. This relationship is significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = .231, p = .000). The results 
show that there is a positive relationship between revenues earned by the organization and the 
respondents’ preference for public good measures within these same organizations. More 
specifically, the more revenue an organization earns annually, the higher the level of preference 
for client measures.   
Another apparent relationship is that between education and preference for public good 
measures (Tau-c = -.203, p = .000). The results show that relationship is negative between 
respondents’ highest level of education attained and their preference for public good measures. 
More specifically, the more education the respondent has, the less he or she tends to prefer public 
good measures.  
The results show that there is a slight negative relationship between position and 
preference for public good measures in these organizations (Tau-c = -.180, p = .000). More 
specifically, the higher the respondents’ position within the organization, the less the respondent 
tended to prefer financial measures.  
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When considering the relationship between experience and preference for public good 
measures, a slight relationship seems to exist (Tau-c = .141, p = .001). More specifically, the 
more experience the respondent has within the business, the more the respondent tends to prefer 
public good measures.  
A slight relationship also seems to exist between organizations that have previously been 
awarded at least one prime contract and preference for public good measures in these 
organizations (Lambda = .118; p = .000). The average preference for financial measures 
exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one contract is 2.61, while 
the average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have never been 
awarded a prime contract is 2.31 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors 
that have previously been awarded at least one prime contract prefer financial measures slightly 
more than contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract. 
The results also show that there is somewhat of a relationship between ISO certification 
and preference for public good measures (Lambda = .079, p = .012). The average preference for 
public good measures for respondents that come from organizations that are ISO certified is 2.20 
and the average preference for public good measures for respondents that come from 
organizations that are not ISO certified is 2.55. This finding indicates that, on average, 
contractors that are not ISO certified prefer public good measures slightly more than those 
contractors that are ISO certified. 
 Additionally, the results show that there is somewhat of a relationship between 
organizations that have previously been awarded at least one federal government subcontract and 
preference for public good measures (Lambda = .144; p = .000). The average preference for 
public good measures exhibited by contractors that have previously been awarded at least one 
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federal government subcontract is 2.60, while the average preference for public good measures 
exhibited by contractors that have never been awarded a federal government subcontract is 2.35 
(Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have previously been 
awarded at least one federal government subcontract prefer public good measures slightly more 
than contractors that have never been awarded a federal government subcontract.  
The results also show that there is a relationship between receiving a federally subsidized 
loan and preference for public good measures in these organizations (Lambda = .153; p = .000). 
The average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have never received 
a federally subsidized loan is 2.64 (Table 14), while the average preference for organizations that 
have received at least one federally subsidized loan is 2.25. This finding indicates that, on 
average, contractors that have never received a federally subsidized loan prefer public good 
measures slightly more than contractors that have previously received at least one federally 
subsidized loan. 
There is also an apparent relationship between OSDBU training and preference for public 
good measures in these organizations (Lambda = .120, p = .002). The average preference for 
financial measures in organizations that have never received training through the OSDBU office 
is 2.61 (Table 14), while the average preference for financial measures by contractors that have 
received training through the OSDBU office is 2.27. This finding indicates that, on average, 
contractors that have not received training through the OSDBU office prefer public good 
measures slightly more than contractors that have received training through the OSDBU office.  
Teaming agreements and preference for public good measures also appear to have a 
relationship in these organizations (Lambda = .067; p = .037). The average preference for public 
good measures exhibited by contractors that have previously participated in teaming agreements 
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is 2.54, while the average preference for public good measures exhibited by contractors that have 
never participated in a teaming agreement is 2.36 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on 
average, contractors that have previously participated in a teaming agreement prefer public good 
measures more than contractors that have never participated in a teaming agreement.  
Preference for Internal Management Process Measures 
Table 17 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for internal 
management process measures and the independent variables.  
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Table 17 
Preference for Internal Management Process Measures 
 Measure of association Test of significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p Χ2 
Revenues -.106  .035 186.3 (p = .000) 
Experience -.138  .001 322.0 (p = .000) 
Age 252.08  .000 252.1 (p = .000) 
Education -.163  .001 180.6 (p = .000) 
Position -.106  .047 309.2 (p = .000) 
Prime  .254 .000 134.8 (p = .000) 
ISO  .079 .012 320.0 (p = .000) 
Subcontract  .147 .000 125.3 (p = .000) 
Top 100  .215 .000 158.0 (p = .000) 
Loan  .198 .000 251.8 (p = .000) 
Contract type  .170 .000 196.7 (p = .000) 
Competitive  .216 .000 137.9 (p = .000) 
Train  .155 .000 169.8 (p = .000) 
Team  .000 —     36.4 (p = .000) 
Mentor  .045 .032 100.3 (p = .000) 
ISO  .064 .002 176.4 (p = .000) 
Mission  .219 .000 329.7 (p = .000) 
Sex  .141 .002 76.5 (p = .000) 
 
 
The results shown here tend to support the notion that there appears to be a negative 
relationship between position and preference for internal management process measures. More 
specifically, the higher the respondents’ position within the organization, the less the respondents 
 109
tend to prefer financial measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .05 level 
(Tau-c = -.106, p = .047).  
The results also tend to show that there is a negative relationship between annual 
revenues earned by an organization and respondents’ preference for internal management 
process measures. More specifically, the more revenue an organization earns annually, the less 
the respondent tended to prefer internal management process measures. This relationship is 
statistically significant at the .05 level (Tau-c = -.106, p = .035). 
A negative relationship also appears to exist between organizational experience and 
respondents’ preference for internal management process measures. More specifically, the longer 
an organization has been in existence, the less the respondent tends to prefer internal 
management process measures. This relationship is significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = -.138, 
p = .001).  
A positive relationship seems to exist between age of the respondent and preference for 
internal management process measures. More specifically, the older the respondent is, the more 
he or she tends to prefer financial measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 
level (Tau-c = -.152, p = .000).  
Based on the results of this study, a negative relationship seems to exist between level of 
education attained by the respondent and preference for internal management process measures. 
More specifically, the more education the respondent has, the less he or she tends to prefer 
financial measures. This relationship is statistically significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = -.163, 
p = .001).  
The most noteworthy level of association with respondents’ preferences for internal 
management process measures is with prime contracting. The results show that there is a 
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relationship between organizations that have previously been awarded at least one prime contract 
and respondents’ preferences for public good measures in these organizations (Lambda = .254, 
p = .000). The average preference for financial measures exhibited by contractors that have 
previously been awarded at least one contract is 2.47, while the average preference for financial 
measures exhibited by contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract is 2.62 
(Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have previously been 
awarded at least one prime contract tend to prefer financial measures slightly less than 
contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract. 
Another slight relationship that seems to exist is that between organizations that are ISO 
certified and preference for internal management process measures (Lambda = .079; p = .012). 
The average preference for internal management process measures exhibited by contractors that 
are ISO certified is 2.49, while the average preference for internal management process measures 
exhibited by contractors that are not ISO certified is 2.54 (Table 14). This finding indicates that 
contractors that are and contractors that are not ISO certified tend to prefer internal management 
process measures at about the same level. 
Based on the results of this research there appears to be somewhat of a relationship 
between organizations that have previously been awarded at least one federal government 
subcontract and preference for internal management process measures (Lambda = .147; 
p = .000). The average preference for internal management process measures exhibited by 
contractors that have previously been awarded at least one federal government subcontract is 
2.56, while the average preference for internal management process measures exhibited by 
contractors that have never been awarded a federal government subcontract is 2.50 (Table 14).  
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Another relationship that seems to exist is that between organizations that have never 
received a federally subsidized loan and preference for internal management process measures in 
these organizations (Lambda = .198; p = .000). The average preference for internal management 
process measures exhibited by contractors that have received at least one federally subsidized 
loan is 2.64, while the average preference for organizations that have never received a federally 
subsidized loan is 2.29 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have 
received at least one federally subsidized loan prefer internal management process measures 
more than contractors that have never received a federally subsidized loan. 
There is also an apparent relationship between OSDBU training and preference for 
internal management process measures in these organizations (Lambda = .155; p = .000). The 
average preference for internal management process measures in organizations that have 
received training through the OSDBU office is 2.71, while the average preference for internal 
management process measures by contractors that have never received training through the 
OSDBU office is 2.48 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have 
received training through the OSDBU office prefer internal management process measures more 
than contractors that have not received training through the OSDBU office.  
There is a very slight relationship between mentorship and preference for internal 
management process measures in these organizations (Lambda = .045; p = .032). The average 
preference for internal management process measures exhibited by contractors that have 
participated in the mentorship program is 2.64, while the average preference for internal 
management process measures exhibited by contractors that never participated in the mentorship 
program is 2.50 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have had 
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mentors prefer internal management process measures more than contractors that have not had 
mentors.  
The results also tend to show that there is a relationship between sex and preference for 
internal management process measures (Lambda = .141; p = .002). The average preference for 
internal management process measures exhibited by male respondents is 2.43, while the average 
preference for internal management process measures by female respondents is 2.53 (Table 14). 
This finding indicates that male and female respondents are almost equal in their preference for 
internal management process measures but with female respondents preferring internal 
management process measures slightly more than male respondents did.  
Preference for Employee Measures  
Table 18 presents measures of association between respondents’ preferences for 
employee measures and the independent variables.  
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Table 18 
Preference for Employee Measures 
 Measure of association Test of 
significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p Χ2 
Revenues .200  .000 551.7 (p = .000)
Experience .385  .000 348.0 (p = .000)
Age .099  .049 199.4 (p = .000)
Education .067  .099 220.7 (p = .000)
Position -.122  .006 331.6 (p = .000)
Prime  .098 .000 83.1 (p = .000)
ISO  .079 .012 320.0 (p = .000)
Subcontract  .135 .000 102.3 (p = .000)
Top 100  .019 .680 69.2 (p = .000)
Loan  .092 .001 122.1 (p = .000)
Contract type  .134 .000 165.1 (p = .000)
Competitive  .103 .054 58.9 (p = .000)
Train  .124 .000 174.9 (p = .000)
Team  .083 .001 59.5 (p = .000)
Mentor  .022 .272 59.8 (p = .037)
ISO  .146 .000 370.9 (p = .000)
Mission  .198 .000 424.6 (p = .000)
Sex  .058 .007 51.4 (p = .004)
 
 
The results show that the strongest relationship with preference for employee measures is 
organizational experience. More specifically, the longer an organization has been in existence, 
 114
the higher the level of preference of the respondent in that organization for employee measures. 
This relationship is significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = .385, p = .000).  
There is an apparent positive relationship between organizational revenues and 
respondents’ preference for employee measures. More specifically, the higher annual revenues 
earned by the organization, the higher the level of preference of the respondent in that 
organization for employee measures. This relationship is significant at the .01 level 
(Tau-c = .200, p = .000). 
 There also seems to be somewhat of a negative relationship between position and 
preference for employee measures. More specifically, the higher the position of the respondent, 
the lower the level of preference of the respondent for employee measures. This relationship is 
significant at the .01 level (Tau-c = -.122, p = .006).  
A relatively weak relationship is exhibited between age and preference for employee 
measures. More specifically, and the older the respondent, the more the respondent was likely to 
prefer employee measures, but only very slightly. This relationship is significant at the .05 level 
(Tau-c = .099, p = .049).  
A slight relationship appears to exist between organizations that have previously been 
awarded at least one prime contract and preference for financial measures in these organizations 
(Lambda = .098; p = .000). The average preference for employee measures exhibited by 
contractors that have previously been awarded at least one contract is 1.82, while the average 
preference for employee measures exhibited by contractors that have never been awarded a 
prime contract is 1.30 (Table 14). This finding indicates that, on average, contractors that have 
previously been awarded at least one prime contract prefer employee measures more than 
contractors that have never been awarded a prime contract.  
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All of the other independent variables that were considered in this study have weak levels 
of association with preference for employee measures. Therefore these variables will not be 
further discussed. Additionally, since preference for employee measures was the least preferred 
type of performance measures, the researcher has deemed these relationships immaterial and not 
worthy of further consideration.  
Summary 
The following findings were presented in this chapter: 
First, clients tend to prefer financial performance measures the most. Since this is the 
client group that is being evaluated in this instance, one could logically expect preference for 
client measures to be the most highly regarded type of performance measures. However, 
financial measures were shown to be the most preferred types of measures for the client group. 
This is especially surprising, considering the fact that there has been such an emphasis on the 
more humanistic side, as opposed to mechanistic side, of management (i.e. balanced scorecards, 
TQM, etc). Financial measures are obviously still perceived as being the most important 
measures in evaluating the performance of the OSDBU.  
Second, internal management process measures are the second most preferred group of 
performance measures by the clients. This is a possible indication that people generally have 
confidence in the security and anonymity of the bureaucratic structure. Once again, internal 
management process measures would tend to be mechanistic measures. By sheer nature, highly 
structured systems promote fairness and consistency, thereby minimizing the effects of political 
behavior, favoritism, and nepotism. This perceived equity associated with bureaucratic structure 
can serve as a potential source of motivation for the small business owner who can otherwise 
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become frustrated with the divisiveness of highly political activity. These types of mechanistic 
measures also provide objectivity in evaluating performance. Therefore, internal management 
process measures also provide a certain level of assurance of administrative accountability for 
the service and decision making processes. 
Third, employee measures were the least preferred group of performance measures by 
the clients. This result suggests that employees’ performance should be the concern of their 
managers or supervisors, and employees’ performance may be addressed as an issue of an 
agency’s internal management practice. Though employee measures are the least preferred 
measures, these measures should not be misconstrued as not being important. The relationship of 
employee measures to the other sets of measures is what is noteworthy. The importance of this 
relationship will be expanded upon in Chapter VI.  
Fourth, there were only slight differences between the client preferences for internal 
management process measures and public good measures. This is an indication that there are 
only slight variations in the level of preferences that the clients have for these two sets of 
measures. In other words, there are no major variations in the level of preference for these 
performance measures exhibited by the clients. Perhaps the clients view the measures that 
determine whether or not the internal mechanisms of the organization are functioning properly as 
having the same approximate level of importance as the external measures that the overseeing 
organizations has on these agencies and their programs.   
Fifth, there is strong correlation between preference for financial measures and 
preference for client measures. This result may reflect the tendency of respondents, who are the 
managers in the private sector, to link customer satisfaction with financial success. Satisfied 
customers tend to be repeat customers. They also tend to promote those businesses with which 
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they are satisfied via word-of-mouth advertising. Therefore, customer satisfaction tends to lead 
to increased profits in the commercial arena. 
Sixth, there is a strong relationship between preference for financial measures and 
experience, and there is a strong association between preference for client measures and 
revenues. These findings may reflect the assessment that in the private sector financial success is 
the key for business. The longer respondents remain in business and the larger their 
organizations become, the more they tend to realize and agree with this assessment.  
Seventh, there is evidence of a relationship between preference for public good measures 
and competitive status. This result may reflect the policy impact of less competitive “set aside” 
contracting in which disadvantaged business owners are offered assistance. These businesses are 
more favorable to the measures of public good.  
Eighth, preference for internal management processes and prime contracting seem to be 
related. In order for business owners to secure a prime contract with a governmental agency or 
department, they must be well versed in bureaucratic processes. By conducting business with the 
federal government, they must contend with the myriad of paperwork and the countless operating 
procedures typified within the departments and agencies. Consequently, these business owners 
should have a preference for internal management process measures. Though no one likes 
bureaucracy, per se, the environment in which prime contractors function is extremely 
bureaucratic, so it seems natural that these business owners would have a preference for 
measures that accurately reflect this milieu. 
This chapter presented the results of univariate and bivariate analyses, which are 
sufficient to answer the three research questions. Multivariate analysis was conducted. 
Nevertheless, multiple regression results of the client survey are very different from the results 
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from the manager survey, which suggests problems in the specification of the multivariate 
modeling process. Future efforts will have to validate or invalidate the bivariate and univariate 
results of this study before multivariate analysis results can be reported with a certain level of 
confidence. Therefore these results are not being reported in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER VI 
MANAGER SURVEY RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the statistical results of the manager survey. This analysis will 
primarily answer the second and third research questions: “What are the stakeholders’ 
preferences for performance measures?” and “What determines the preferences?” As discussed 
in Chapter V, the underlying premise is that it is critical to know what various stakeholder 
groups want from a performance measurement system. A critical step is the identification of the 
stakeholder group to which the policy is being presented so that the policy can be appropriately 
framed. 
In Chapter V, the results of the client survey were presented. In this chapter, the results of 
the manager survey are presented. Preferences of surveyed managers to performance measures 
will be presented. Managers develop and implement measurement systems. Their perception of 
the importance of different measures is critical for the design and implementation of measures. 
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Univariate Analysis 
Univariate Analysis of the Dependent Variable 
Table 19 presents survey items to measure the dependent variables that are the manager 
preferences for the performance measures. Actual survey items and their corresponding 
measurement perspectives are included in the table. 
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Table 19 
Survey Items to Measure the Dependent Variables—Preferences for Performance Measures 
Item Perspective Description 
A client the number of clients that participate in the Mentor–Protégé Program  
E client the number of clients that participate in teaming agreements 
J client the percentage of clients that are happy or very satisfied with the level 
of service provided by the OSDBU 
P client the number of clients that participate in OSDBU programs 
C financial dollar amount spent by the OSDBU per client 
I financial dollar amount spent per contract by the OSDBU 
B financial the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients 
L financial the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients 
annually 
F employee percentage of employees rated above “satisfactory” on their 
performance appraisals 
D employee the number of employees that attend job related training workshops 
G employee the number of OSDBU employees that have a bachelors degree or 
higher  
Q employee the number of employees that attend job-related conferences annually 
K processes the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU  
O processes the number of OSDBU employees per contract awarded to OSDBU 
clients 
N processes the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be become certified  
M processes the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a 
contract 
H public good the percentage of citizens who are happy with the OSDBU’s 
performance 
R public good the percentage of elected officials who are satisfied with the OSDBU’s 
performance 
S public good the percentage of its SBA mandated goals achieved 
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The questions on the manager survey instrument were categorized so that the responses 
were grouped into the same five designed measurement perspectives used in the client survey 
instrument: financial perspectives, client perspectives, employee perspectives, internal 
management process perspectives, and public good perspectives.  
Table 20 shows the descriptive statistics of the respondents’ preferences for performance 
measures. Percentages of “very important,” “important,” “somewhat important,” and “not 
important” for each individual item that assesses preferences towards performance measures are 
presented in the table. The means and standard deviations of these survey items are also 
presented.  
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Table 20 
Descriptive Analysis of Respondents’ Preferences for Performance Measures 
Variable %  
Very 
important 
% 
Important 
% 
Somewhat 
important 
% 
Not 
important 
Mean Std dev 
Client       
Item A — 8.7 56.7 34.6 1.74 .607 
Item E — 25.8 53.9 20.3 2.05 .679 
Item J — 22.7 57.0 20.3 2.02 .658 
Item P 23.4 59.4 16.4 0.8 3.05 .656 
Average 5.85 29.15 46.0 19.0 2.22 .650 
       
Financial       
Item C 12.5 57.8 28.1 1.6 2.81 .661 
Item I — 11.0 50.4 38.6 1.72 .651 
Item B 4.7 50.4 38.6 6.3 2.53 .687 
Item L — 9.4 60.2 30.5 1.79 .597 
Average 4.30 32.15 44.33 19.25 2.24 .649 
       
Employee       
Item F 1.6 14.1 58.6 25.8 1.91 .676 
Item D 44.5 45.3 10.2 — 3.34 .657 
Item G 18.8 61.7 18.8 0.8 2.98 .640 
Item Q 16.4 68.0 14.8 0.8 3.00 .589 
Average 20.3 47.3 25.6 9.13 2.13 .641 
       
Processes       
Item K — 22.7 51.6 25.8 1.97 .698 
Item O 24.2 60.2 14.8 0.8 3.07 .647 
Item N — 24.4 64.6 11.0 2.13 .582 
Item M 41.4 49.2 7.8 1.6 3.30 .714 
Average 16.33 39.13 34.7 9.8 2.62 .660 
       
Public Good       
Item H 7.1 31.7 50.0 11.1 2.35 .773 
Item J 22.6 62.1 12.1 3.2 3.03 .721 
Item S 46.8 41.3 9.5 2.4 3.32 .776 
Average 25.5 45.0 23.87 4.9 2.90 .757 
Note:  See Table 19 for item descriptions. 
 
 124
Table 20 shows several interesting findings. First, on average, survey respondents scored 
2.90 on the items measuring preference for public good measures (with 4=very important, 
3=important, 2=somewhat important, and 1=not important), the highest average score of all 
measures of the five measurement perspectives. This result indicates that, on average, managers 
prefer public good measures more than any other type of measure. The result suggests that the 
federal managers that work for the various OSDBU offices within the various governmental 
agencies are committed to serving those to whom they report. With the public good measures 
representing the elected officials, and thus the citizens of the respective jurisdictions, the 
managers appear to have preferences that are aligned with those measures that reflect these 
constituencies and the public in general. 
Another interesting finding is that, on average, survey respondents scored 2.62 on the 
items measuring preference for internal management process measures. This result indicates that 
these employees have a relatively strong preference for the mechanistic processes found within 
the intensely bureaucratic structure of the federal government. Since most of these managers 
have more than five years experience within their current positions (Table 21), these employees 
have been acclimated to the rigid policies and procedures typically found within these 
organizations. 
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Table 21 
Respondents’ Level of Experience Within Current Position (N = 126) 
Years of experience Number of cases Percentage of total 
Less than 1 year 1 0.8 
1–2 years 6 4.8 
3–4 years 10 7.9 
5–6 years 12 9.5 
7–8 years 47 37.3 
9 or more years 50 39.7 
 
A third interesting finding is that preference for financial measures ranked third among 
the federal managers. Financial measures are the bottom line within profit-seeking organizations 
and are therefore the preferred types of measures for those within the private sector. However, 
based on these findings, the federal managers prefer both public good measures and internal 
management process measures over financial measures. This difference indicates that these 
managers are more committed to serving the public and their superiors and that they are more 
committed to functioning within the confines of the federal bureaucratic structure than they are 
to financial measures. 
A fourth finding of interest is that, just as employee measures are the least preferred 
measures for the clients, employee measures are also the least preferred measures for the 
managers.  
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As shown in Table 22, there are no strong correlations found within this correlation 
analysis of the dependent variable. This finding in and of itself possibly represents a sort of 
diversity within the ranks of the respondents. Though the managers that responded to these 
questionnaires are similar in that they have served in their current positions for many years, they 
are also diverse in that they all work for different agencies. There are approximately three to four 
respondents per agency. Therefore, these respondents are spread relatively evenly across many 
agencies, thereby reflecting many different organizational expectations, norms, and values.  
 
Table 22 
Manager Correlation Table of Index Variables 
 Financial Client Internal Employee Public good 
Financial 1.00     
Client -.003 1.00    
Internal -.063 .130 1.00   
Employee -.068 .096 -.063 1.00  
Public good -.079 -.013 -.044 -.176 1.00 
 
Manager Perspective Analysis 
Preference for public good measures received the overall highest scores, with a mean 
score of 2.90. Preference for public good measures also had the tightest overall fit, with a range 
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of 0.97. The highest score within this perspective was 3.32 (the second highest single score), and 
the lowest score within this perspective was 2.35.  
The second highest single score was 3.32. This score was associated with the response 
“the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU,” which is an internal 
management process measure. The third highest single score was 3.30, and this score was 
associated with the response “the number of workshops and forums held per year by the 
OSDBU.” As opposed to the top three responses for the client groups which preferred outcome 
measures, the manager group rated output measures highest. 
Interestingly, the next three highest responses, which the researcher terms “second tier” 
responses, were rated extremely closely. These responses were “the average amount of time for 
an OSDBU client to become certified” (3.07), “the average amount of time for an OSDBU client 
to be awarded a contract” (3.05), and “the percentage of elected officials who are satisfied with 
the OSDBU’s performance” (3.03). Once again, of the six highest rated responses, only the fifth 
response is an outcome measure. The other measures are all output measures. 
Preference for employee measures received the lowest overall scores, with a mean score 
of 2.13. Interestingly, the highest single score in this perspective was 3.34, which coincidentally 
was the highest overall single measure. This score was associated with the response “the number 
of clients that participate in OSDBU programs.” Another interesting fact is that this perspective 
also had the highest disparity, with a range of 1.43. Though preference for employee measures 
was the lowest scoring perspective for both client measures and manager measures, the manager 
ratings were obviously not as low as the client ratings. In other words, the managers tend to have 
more regard for employee measures than clients do, though both groups rate them relatively low.  
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Univariate Analysis of the Independent Variables 
Table 23 presents survey items measuring independent variables. Actual survey items and 
their abbreviated variable names used in analysis of this study are presented in the table. 
 
Table 23 
Survey Items to Measure the Independent Variables 
Item Description Variable name 
1 respondent’s current job title titlem 
2 amount of time in that position posexpm 
3 amount of time in that agency or department depexpm 
4 other federal agency experience otherm 
6 total years of federal government experience fedexpm 
7 annual contract dollars awarded to small businesses by that agency contm 
8 respondent’s opinion of client perception of the OSDBU mission custm 
9 has respondent ever owned own business ownm 
11 respondent’s gender genderm 
12 respondent’s age agem 
13 respondent’s level of educational attainment educm 
 
There are 19 independent variables in this analysis and they are the same as the ones used 
in the client survey. This section of this chapter presents the univariate analysis of several 
selected independent variables. The variables that were selected for detailed analysis are level of 
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experience in current position, annual contract dollars awarded to small businesses by the 
respective agency, the perception of client’s understanding of the OSDBU mission, age, and 
gender. These variables represent the mean responses that were rated most highly and therefore 
can be considered to be most important to the respondent. 
Table 21 describes the frequency distribution of the respondents’ level of experience 
within their current positions at their respective agencies. Approximately 77% of the respondents 
have seven or more years of experience in their current positions and nearly 40% of the 
respondents have nine or more years of experience in their current positions. The longevity of 
these federal government managers is consistent with the nature of these positions. In order for 
offices such as the OSDBU to effectively run and manage the various programs that they are 
responsible for administering, the overseer needs to be a very “seasoned” executive. He or she 
must have a very strong network of individuals, both within their federal governmental agencies 
and entrepreneurs operating as contractors and sub-contractors. This individual must be very 
knowledgeable of the administrative processes to keep the operations functioning properly.  
Around 75% of these agencies award in excess of $7,500,000 to small businesses 
annually (see Table 24). Around 64% of them award more than $10,000,000 annually. Though 
these may sound like very large amounts, they are a mere fraction of the amounts of overall 
contract dollars awarded by federal agencies each year. Though these small businesses cannot 
compete with the huge prime contractors such as Lockheed-Martin or Boeing, these small 
business fill critical niches that often cannot be filled by these mega corporations. They are also 
often much more responsive and flexible because they do not have the strict bureaucratic 
processes often associated with large companies. 
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Table 24 
Annual Contract Dollars Awarded to Small Businesses by Respondents’ Respective Agencies 
(N = 125) 
Annual contracts awarded Number of cases Percentage of total 
Less than $1,000,000 18 14.4 
$1,000,001–$2,500,000 9 7.2 
$2,500,001–$5,000,000 6 4.8 
$5,000,001–$7,500,000 0 0.0 
$7,500,001–$10,000,000 12 9.6 
More than $10,000,000 80 64.0 
 
Though the purpose of the OSDBU is to provide information to the small business 
owners, it is interesting to note that 30% of the managers feel that the small business clients 
believe that it is the OSDBU’s responsibility to actually find contracts for them (see Table 25). 
Additionally, nearly 24% of these managers believe that the small business clients are of the 
opinion that it is the OSDBU’s responsibility to introduce them to contracting officers or those 
persons that are in charge of awarding contracts. However, nearly half of these respondents were 
correct in their perception of the mission of the OSDBU. 
 
 131
Table 25 
Respondents’ Perception of Clients’ Understanding of the OSDBU Mission (N = 193) 
Respondents’ perception Number of cases Percentage of total 
To find contracts for clients’ businesses 37 29.4 
To help clients write proposals — — 
To introduce clients to contracting officers 30 23.8 
To provide sources of funds for clients’ businesses — — 
To disseminate information to clients 126 46.8 
Note: The question did not indicate that the respondent should check only one answer, and quite 
a few respondents selected more than one answer. 
 
Only 5.6% of the respondents were 30 years old or younger (see Table 26); therefore 
94.4% of the respondents are more than 30 years old. This distribution is also an indication of the 
experience that is necessary to effectively function in a position such as this one. Though some 
of the knowledge and skills needed for this position are those types of skills that can be learned 
in a classroom and through other types of formal structured learning, much of it must be acquired 
through experience and longevity, particularly the people skills that must be relied upon when 
interacting with all involved parties. 
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Table 26 
Respondents’ Age (N = 126) 
Respondents’ age Number of cases Percentage of total 
30 or younger 7 5.6 
31–39 30 29.4 
40–49 67 53.2 
50–59 19 15.1 
60 or older 3 2.4 
 
Table 27 shows that just slightly more than half of the respondents were male and slightly 
less than half female, indicating that a person of either sex can effectively function in these types 
of administrative positions.  
 
Table 27 
Respondents’ Gender (N = 126) 
 
Gender Number of cases Percentage of total 
Male 70 55.6 
Female 56 44.4 
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Bivariate Analysis 
Preference for Financial Measures  
 
Table 28 presents measures of association between preferences for financial measures 
and the independent variables. 
 
Table 28 
Preference for Financial Measures 
 Measure of association  Test of significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p  Χ2 p 
Position experience -.075  .242  17.34 .968 
Annual contract dollars -.045  .525  305.03 .408 
Mission perception .008  .924  8.77 .723 
Age -.172  .003  20.74 .654 
Gender  .007 .796  2.08 .912 
 
The results show that there is a slight negative relationship between age and preference 
for financial measures Tau-c = -.172, p = .003). More specifically, the older the respondent, the 
less likely he or she is to prefer financial measures. This relationship is significant at the .002 
level. Age is the only independent variable that is shown to have a significant relationship with 
preference for financial measures. 
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Preference for Client Measures  
Table 29 presents measures of association between preferences for client measures and 
the independent variables. 
 
Table 29 
Preference for Client Measures 
 Measure of association  Test of significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p  χ 2 p 
Position experience .048  .506  35.96 .209 
Annual contract dollars -.066  .336  276.31 .833 
Mission perception -.042  .602  6.16 .908 
Age .030  .643  16.75 .859 
Gender  .043 .154  6.03 .420 
 
These results do not show any independent variables that have a significant measure of 
association with client measures.   
Preference for Employee Measures 
Table 30 presents measures of association between preferences for employee measures 
and the independent variables. 
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Table 30 
Preference for Employee Measures 
    Measure of association    Test of significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p  χ 2 p 
Position experience -.009  .885  56.37 .012* 
Annual contract dollars .049  .441  334.50 .716 
Mission perception .012  .887  12.00 .606 
Age .028  .713  60.67 .000** 
Gender  .035 .410  7.13 .406 
*p < .05. **p < .01 
 
These results show that there is a very slight negative relationship between position 
experience and preference for employee measures (Tau-c = -.009, p = .003). In other words, the 
longer a respondent has been in his or her position, the less likely he or she is to prefer employee 
measures. This relationship is significant at the .05 level. Age is also shown to have a 
relationship with preference for employee measures (X2 = 60.67, p = .000).   
Preference for Internal Management Process Measures 
Table 31 presents measures of association between preferences for internal management 
process measures and the independent variables. 
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Table 31 
Preference for Internal Management Process Measures 
   Measure of association    Test of significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p  χ 2 p 
Position experience .045  .467  16.66 .976 
Annual contract dollars -.015  .831  318.81 .218 
Mission perception .001  .994  9.84 .630 
Age .054  .447  23.40 .496 
Gender  .050 .405  10.98 .089 
 
These results do not show any independent variables that have a significant measure of 
association with internal management process measures.   
Preference for Public Good Measures 
Table 32 presents measures of association between preferences for public good measures 
and the independent variables. 
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Table 32 
Preference for Public Good Measures 
       Measure of association  Test of significance 
 Tau-c Lambda p  χ 2 p 
Position experience .011  .872  37.70 .574 
Annual contract dollars -.096  .161  383.83 .711 
Mission perception -.139  .089  18.57 .292 
Age .010  .890  30.49 .543 
Gender  .107 .136  10.84 .211 
 
These results do not show any independent variables that have a significant measure of 
association with public good measures.   
Summary 
Based on the results of the univariate analysis, public good measures were the most 
preferred measures by managers in the survey. Clients, on the other hand, preferred financial 
measures most. Based on these findings, the researcher concluded that managers within the 
federal government have a preference for the measures that represent and assess public good. 
These measures are largely determined by those public administrators who are responsible for 
developing the macro measures that the governmental agencies must abide by. Some examples 
include the SBA, which sets the mandates for contracting goals and the Government Accounting 
Office (GAO), which determines the financial standards for the other governmental agencies. 
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The managers’ preference for public good measures may possibly be a result of, once again, a 
preference for strict adherence to administrative procedure. Another possible explanation is that 
these managers prefer public good measures because they are public officials and they work to 
serve the interests of public, which is represented by the elected officials.  
Second, preference for internal management processes was the second most preferred 
measure by the federal managers. It is not surprising that these managers would prefer internal 
management processes. Rank, promotions, and raises are typically more systematic in the public 
sector. This is because salary grades are usually very specific and promotions are relatively well 
defined within the federal government. Therefore, those managers that have chosen career paths 
within the federal government have chosen to function in this environment.  
Third, preference for financial measures and preference for client measures are almost 
equal, though financial measures were slightly more preferred. The researcher finds this 
conclusion to be especially noteworthy because both preference for public good measures and 
preference for internal management process measures were rated more highly than financial 
measures by the surveyed managers. This indicates that federal managers are more concerned 
with administrative processes than with fiscal effectiveness. Financial success in the public 
sector is difficult to assess, and traditionally these measures are not emphasized in daily 
management. This finding may suggest a need to provide financial education to federal 
managers, thereby enhancing their sense of fiscal responsibility. 
Similar to the results of the client surveys, employee measures are the least preferred by 
the federal managers. As was mentioned in the summary of Chapter V, it is interesting to note 
that both clients and managers rated employee measures lowest. One logical explanation is that 
the managers feel that once the individual secures a position within the governmental agency, he 
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or she simply becomes a mechanism in the entire system. Once he or she becomes a part of the 
system, then the individual’s performance becomes the responsibility of his or her manager. 
Basically, the system should be evaluated from a macro point of view. In other words, both 
managers and clients are more concerned with organizational measures as opposed to individual 
measures.  
None of the preferences for these perspectives were correlated with each other. 
Therefore, all of these stand alone, independently. This result is surprising in light of strong 
associations of clients’ preferences for measurement perspectives. Managers may clearly realize 
the different roles of these measurement perspectives in assessing organizational performance, 
while clients’ views of these roles may be unclear.  
As was done with the results of the client survey in Chapter V, the data from the 
manager’s survey and the resulting analysis presented in this chapter include only univariate and 
bivariate analysis. These analyses are sufficient to answer three research questions. Though 
multivariate analysis was conducted, the results from the managers’ survey were very different 
from those of clients. For example, none of independent variables is found to be statistically 
associated with the preferences for performance measurement, while in the analysis of client 
survey, a large number of independent variables are found to be associated with the preferences. 
This discrepancy leads to a possibility of a problem in the multivariate model specification. 
Because of this and other reasons, these multivariate analysis results are also not being reported 
in this dissertation.  
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction  
Despite the importance of federal managers and their clients in the administrative 
process, little is known about the preferences of these groups when it comes to performance 
measures. This dissertation provided an analysis of the performance measurement preferences of 
federal managers and their clients. Based on the results and findings about these two groups of 
stakeholders, a clearer understanding of the preferences of various groups of stakeholders 
emerged. Understanding the preferences of the various groups of stakeholders makes it possible 
to develop, use, and maintain effective and efficient performance measurement systems.  
Performance measurement systems are not meant to be developed and to then sit in a 
binder on a shelf as a type of trophy or status symbol. These systems should be developed so that 
the execution of public policy through very specific mechanisms of departmentalization and 
other forms of administrative processes, policies, and procedures can be accomplished. If done in 
an effective and efficient way, these systems should both promote accountability and provide the 
means for demonstrating that accountability when called upon to do so. By executing the study 
reported in this dissertation, the researcher has attempted to bring some conceptual clarity to the 
area of performance measurement systems.  
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The researcher attempted to answer three research questions: What measures should be 
included in the MBSC model? What are the stakeholders’ preferences for these measures? What 
determines the preferences? 
In order to answer the first research question, the general progression of previous 
budgetary models used in the public sector was used to develop the Modified Balance Scorecard 
(MBSC). Based on the BSC model, which is touted as being one of the most influential ideas of 
the 20th century, this model has the potential to revolutionize current performance measurement 
standards within the public sector. The MBSC is a model of five measurement perspectives that 
integrates elements of previous budgetary models into an overall, comprehensive performance 
measurement system. The five perspectives include the financial perspective, the client 
perspective, the employee perspective, the internal management process perspective, and the 
public good perspective. These perspectives were included in the model based on the results of 
an analysis of the existing literature regarding performance measurement in the public sector.  
More important than the practical contributions of this dissertation are the theoretical 
contributions.  Though there have been increasing demands for accountability within the public 
sector, adequate methods of providing this information have not been developed.  Simply using 
models developed for the private sector is not sufficient.  By nature, the public sector is different 
from the private sector.  There is a type of “fused” interest that exists within the public sector 
that does not exist within the private sector, in that the taxpayers that ultimately fund the 
operations of the public sector are also the recipients of the services (and some times goods) 
provided by the public sector.  Within the private sector, the owners of the company, or its 
shareholders, provide the necessary funding for the operations of the organization while its 
customers or clients receive the services or goods provided by the company.  Though the 
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shareholders and clients of a company can be one in the same, typically this is not the case.  Due 
to the existence of this distinctive characteristic, there is a definitely need for the development of 
new performance measurement models or the adaptation of existing ones and the MBSC 
provides a good base model that is flexible enough to be used for the further development of 
future assessment models.             
The second question was answered through quantitative analysis. Based on these results, 
the researcher determined that clients mainly prefer financial, internal management process, and 
public good measures, in that order. Alternatively, the managers prefer public good, internal 
management process, and financial measures, in that order. Both groups tended to prefer 
employee measures least.  
The third question was also answered using quantitative analysis. The most significant 
factors in influencing what determines the preferences of clients were experience, revenues, 
competitiveness, and prime contracting. The only factor that was found to be significant in 
influencing the performance measurement preferences of the managers was experience. 
These factors and their resulting preferences can be used to design assessment 
instruments that are customized for the appropriate stakeholder group. Consequently, the results 
of this research are important in policy formulation and provide many implications regarding the 
effective presentation of policies. These results can be used to help effectively craft policies so 
that these policies can be presented appropriately to various groups. If executed correctly, this 
should aid in presenting performance measurement systems in the most favorable light, thereby 
maximizing acceptance in the utilization of these systems and accuracy in assessing the results of 
implementing these systems. 
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Though the introduction of the Kaplan’s and Norton’s BSC in 1992 as an assessment tool 
was phenomenally important in the area of performance measurement, this model needed to be 
specifically adapted for the public sector. The four perspectives of the BSC presented a more 
comprehensive assessment of performance than had previously been available for use within the 
commercial sector; however, this model failed to adequately encompass the public sector values 
that must be considered when measuring performance within that sector. By adding a fifth 
perspective, the public good, the MBSC was devised for use within the public sector. 
Implications and Recommendations 
Policy Implications  
This research was necessary because there is a lack of empirical research regarding the 
identification and development of performance measures at the federal level, and this includes all 
of the various stakeholder groups. Quality performance measurement systems are even more 
necessary as increasing accountability remains the trend in government. Taxpayers of the United 
States are becoming more sophisticated through better education and increased access to 
information, thereby resulting in increasing demands for more accountability from those 
responsible for running our federal government and from other elected officials. 
Managerial Implications 
From a practical point of view, these findings can be applied to the way policy is 
presented to the various stakeholders. Based on these findings, when policies are being presented 
to client groups, the policy should be presented by emphasizing points from the financial and 
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internal management process perspectives. On the other hand, when policies are being present to 
managers groups, the policy should be presented by emphasizing points from the public good 
and internal management process perspectives.  
Implications for Further Research 
Many areas of research touched on in this dissertation can be further investigated. First, 
manager and client preferences for performance measures could be researched at the state and 
local levels. Second, differences between various client groups could be researched, such as 
prime contractors vs. sub-contractors or small corporations vs. large corporations. One could also 
look at minority owned versus non–minority owned businesses. Additionally, one could research 
differences between federal employees and federal managers. 
One could also alter the research design by changing the types of measures being 
evaluated. For example, one could look at outcome vs. output measures within the same 
measurement perspective. Finally, a fully developed model should be developed to better explain 
stakeholders’ preferences with a probability sampling.  
Another possibility for further research is investigating an agency that is more humanistic 
or one that deals with more social issues, such as the agencies that provide health services.  The 
agency that was used in this dissertation is very technical and scientific in nature.  Therefore, the 
generalizability of the results is questionable. 
Furthermore, multivariate analysis can and should be conducted.  In order to strengthen 
and verify the findings of the univariate and bivariate analysis, multivariate analysis can and 
should be conducted.  Once confirmed through further analysis, all results can be reported with 
confidence and the generalizability of the findings can be incorrigibly established.   
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In closing, performance measurement is vitally important, and its significance continues 
to grow as accountability is emphasized more and more in government. High quality empirical 
research remains necessary in the quest for ideal standards for assessing organizational 
outcomes. Though performance measurement is dynamic and situational, continuous 
improvement should always be the ultimate goal in the long and never-ending process of 
developing and implementing adequate performance-measurement tools. By diligently pursuing 
enhanced standards of accountability, public servants everywhere work together for the 
betterment of the common good for stakeholders at every level, from the meekest citizen to the 
highest elected official. It all falls together in working for the pursuit of a better democratic 
society.  
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CLIENT SURVEYS 
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1. Please indicate your current position. 
 
(1) _____ Owner, CEO or President 
(2) _____ Financial Manager or CFO 
(3) _____ Operations Manager 
(4) _____ Office Manager 
(5) _____ Other 
 
2. Which of the following classifications best describes your business?   
    (Check all that apply.) 
 
(1) _____ Small Business 
(2) _____ Small Disadvantaged Business 
(3) _____ 8(a) 
(4) _____ Woman Owned Business 
(5) _____ HUBZone Small Business 
 
3. Are you a “Top 100” contractor? 
 
a. yes 
b. no 
 
4. How long has your business been in operation? 
 
_____ Less than one year 
_____ 1 – 2 years 
_____ 3 – 4 years 
_____  4 – 5 years 
_____  6 – 7 years 
_____  8 – 9 years 
_____  more than 10 years 
 
5. Has your business received any type of federally subsidized loan before? 
 
(1) _____ Yes 
(2) _____ No 
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2. Please indicate the amount of revenues your business earned last year. 
 
_____ less than $100,000 
_____ from $100,001 to $250,000 
_____ from $250,001 to $500,000 
_____  from $500,001 to $750,000 
_____  from $750,001 to $1,000,000 
_____  More than $1,000,000 
 
7. Has your business ever been awarded a prime contract with a federal governmental agency? 
 
(1) _____ Yes 
(2) _____ No 
 
8. If so, what type of contract was it?  If not, go to question #8. 
(1) supplies and equipment 
  (2) research and development 
  (3) technical services 
  (4) other services 
 
9. Was it won competitively or through a set-aside program? 
 
(1) competitive 
(2) set aside 
(3) I’ve won both types of contracts before 
 
10. Has your business ever been awarded a sub-contract with a federal governmental agency? 
 
(1) _____ Yes 
(2) _____ No 
 
11.  Have you ever received training through an OSBDU program? 
 
(1) _____ Yes 
(2) _____ No  
 
 
12. Have you ever been part of a teaming agreement? 
 
 (1) _____ Yes 
 (2) _____ No 
 
13. Have you ever participated in the Mentor-Protégé Program? 
 (1)  Yes 
 (2)  No 
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14. Are you ISO 9000 certified? 
 
 (1) _____ Yes 
 (2) _____ No 
 
15. From my understanding, the mission of the OSDBU is to 
 
(1) _____  Find contracts or subcontracts for my business 
(2) _____  Help me write proposals to the government when bidding on contracts 
(3) _____  Introduce me to the appropriate contracting officer 
(4) _____  Provide sources of funds for my business 
(5) _____  Dissemination of information and exchange of ideas relative to the utilization of 
small businesses  
 
16. Below is a list of federal OSBDU performance measures.  Please read this list and assess 
 how important they are to you in determining the organization’s level of achievement, using 
 the following scale. 
 
Very important =4 
Important =3 
Somewhat important = 2 
Not Important =1 
Don’t know or can’t say =0 
 
[   ] the number of clients that participate in the Mentor-Protégé Program  
[   ] the number of clients that participate in teaming agreements 
[  ] the percentage of clients that are happy or very satisfied with the level  
     of service provided by the OSDBU 
[   ] the number of clients that participate in OSDBU programs 
[   ] dollar amount spent by the OSDBU per client 
[   ] dollar amount spent per contract by the OSDBU 
[   ] the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients 
[   ] the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients  
      annually 
[   ] percentage of employees rated above “satisfactory” on their  
      performance appraisals  
[   ] the number of employees that attend job related training workshops 
[   ] the number of OSDBU employees that have a bachelors degree or  
      higher 
[   ] the number of employees that attend job-related conferences annually 
[   ] the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU  
[   ] the number of OSDBU employees per contract awarded to OSDBU  
      clients 
[   ] the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be become  
      certified 
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[   ] the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a  
      contract 
[   ] the percentage of citizens who are happy with the performance of the  
      OSDBU 
[   ] the percentage of elected officials who are happy with the  
      performance of the OSDBU 
[   ] the percentage of employees in other parts of NASA who are happy  
      with the performance of the OSDBU 
[   ] the percentage of it SBA mandated goals achieved 
 
 
17. Please indicate your age. 
 
_____  less than 30 years old 
_____  31 to 39 years old 
_____  40 to 49 years old 
_____  50 to 59 years old 
_____  60 to 69 years old 
_____  70 to 79 years old 
_____  80 years old or older 
 
 
18. Please indicate your gender. 
 
_____  male 
_____  female 
_____  not sure 
 
 
19. Please indicate the highest level of education that you have attained. 
 
_____  less than a high school diploma or GED 
_____  High school diploma or GED 
_____  Some college 
_____  AA or AS (Two year) degree 
_____  BA or BS (Four year) degree 
_____  Some graduate education 
_____  Master’s degree 
_____  Doctoral degree 
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1. Please indicate your current title. 
 
(1) _____ Director 
(2) _____ Deputy Director 
(3) _____ Women Business Rep 
(4) _____ Veteran Business Rep 
(5) _____ Other 
 
2. How long have you worked in this position? 
 
_____ Less than one year 
_____ 1 – 2 years 
_____ 3 – 4 years 
_____  4 – 5 years 
_____  6 – 7 years 
_____  8 – 9 years 
_____  more than 10 years 
 
3. How long have you worked for your respective agency or department? 
 
_____ Less than one year 
_____ 1 – 2 years 
_____ 3 – 4 years 
_____  4 – 5 years 
_____  6 – 7 years 
_____  8 – 9 years 
_____  more than 10 years 
 
4. Have you ever worked for any other federal agencies?  If no, go to question 6. 
 
_____ yes 
_____ no 
 
 
5. Which other federal agency or agencies have you worked for? 
 
_______________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________ 
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6. Please indicate the total number of years that you have worked for the federal 
government. 
 
_____ Less than one year 
_____ 1 – 3 years 
_____ 3 – 5 years 
_____  6 – 10 years 
_____  11 – 15 years 
_____  16 - 20 years 
_____  more than 20 years 
  
 
 
7. Please indicate the total dollar amount of contracts awarded to small  
business by your respective agency last fiscal year. 
 
_____ less than $1,000,000 
_____ from $1,000,001 to $2,500,000 
_____ from $2,500,001 to $5,000,000 
_____  from $5,000,001 to $7,500,000 
_____  from $7,500,001 to $10,000,000 
_____  More than $10,000,000 
 
 
8. In my perception, most OSDBU customers feel that the OSDBU mission is to: 
 
(6) _____  Find contracts or subcontracts for their businesses 
(7) _____  Help them write proposals when bidding on contracts 
(8) _____  Introduce them to the appropriate contracting officers so that their bids will be 
exposed to the right person 
(9) _____  Provide sources of funds for their business 
(10) _____  Disseminate information and exchange ideas relative to how their 
businesses can be fully utilized in support of your agency’s or department’s mission  
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9.   Below is a list of federal OSBDU performance measures.  Please read this list and assess 
how important you feel each measure is in determining the organization’s level of 
achievement and success.  Use the following scale. 
 
Very important =4 
Important =3 
Somewhat important = 2 
Not Important =1 
Don’t know or can’t say =0 
 
[   ] the number of clients that participate in the Mentor-Protégé Program  
[   ] the number of clients that participate in teaming agreements 
[   ] the percentage of clients that are happy or very satisfied with the level of  
      service  provided by the OSDBU 
[   ] the number of clients that participate in OSDBU programs 
[   ] dollar amount spent by the OSDBU per client 
[   ] dollar amount spent per contract by the OSDBU 
[   ] the number of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients 
[   ] the average dollar amount of contracts awarded to OSDBU clients  
      annually 
[   ] percentage of employees rated above “satisfactory” on their performance  
      appraisals  
[   ] the number of employees that attend job related training workshops 
[   ] the number of OSDBU employees that have a bachelors degree or higher 
[   ] the number of employees that attend job-related conferences annually 
[   ] the number of workshops and forums held per year by the OSDBU  
[   ] the number of OSDBU employees per contract awarded to OSDBU  
      clients 
[   ] the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be become certified 
[   ] the average amount of time for an OSDBU client to be awarded a  
      contract 
[   ] the percentage of citizens who are happy with the OSDBU’s performance 
[   ] the percentage of elected officials who are happy with the OSDBU’s  
      performance 
[   ] the percentage of employees in other parts of the federal agency who are      
      happy with the performance of the OSDBU 
[   ] the percentage of its SBA mandated goals achieved 
 
10. Please indicate your gender. 
 
_____  male 
_____  female 
_____  not sure 
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11. Please indicate your age. 
 
_____  less than 30 years old 
_____  31 to 39 years old 
_____  40 to 49 years old 
_____  50 to 59 years old 
_____  60 to 69 years old 
_____  70 to 79 years old 
_____  80 years old or older 
 
 
12. Please indicate the highest level of education that you have attained. 
 
_____  less than a high school diploma or GED 
_____  High school diploma or GED 
_____  Some college 
_____  AA or AS (Two year) degree 
_____  BA or BS (Four year) degree 
_____  Some graduate education 
_____  Master’s degree 
_____  Doctoral degree 
 
 
13. Have you ever owned your own business? 
_____ yes 
_____ no 
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